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ABSTRACT 
Although the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, also known as the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was originally an ideologically driven 
militia, it has recently taken an ever more assertive role in virtually every aspect of 
Iranian society.  Why and how did the IRGC become such a relevant actor?   
This study traces the historical and political evolution of the IRGC and challenges 
the conventional wisdom that portrays the Corps as a mere instrument of the state.  
Instead, it argues that the rise of the IRGC within the Iranian regime is the result of two 
negative dynamics in civil-military relations.  First, the mismanagement of service 
rivalries between Iran’s Army and the Corps allowed the latter to have excessive control 
over key state functions, including security strategy, foreign policy and the defense 
sector.  Second, once empowered, there was nothing to keep the IRGC checked and 
balanced, since Iran suffers from a weak system of civilian control.  These two perverse 
dynamics not only shaped the Corps’ identity as a self-contained corporation, but it 
actually propelled it into the center of Iran’s politics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps1 (IRGC) of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(IRI) is a unique establishment that has few parallels in the past and none in the present.2 
Created during the Islamic revolution of 1978–1979, the corps evolved over three 
decades from a vigilante-group nucleus into one of the major and most influential state 
institutions in Iran. The phenomenon of the Pasdaran has many distinctive dimensions 
that are relevant to research in fields such as Iranian and regional studies, national 
security affairs, military politics, terrorism, and asymmetric and unconventional warfare. 
Yet an important factor that has been overlooked and underestimated has surfaced just 
recently—namely, civil–military relations.  
Until recently, conventional wisdom saw the IRGC as just a paramilitary element 
of the IRI national-security system. It was generally portrayed as a force fully subordinate 
to and controlled by the ruling clerics, who used the IRGC as a counterbalance to the 
regular armed forces and as a tool of control and coercion over society in general and 
political opposition in particular.3 However, there is mounting evidence that the corps 
has already surpassed the assumptions appropriate to an ordinary component of the 
security system. The IRGC currently wields responsibility over an impressive variety of 
functions, missions, and tasks in the defense, security, political, ideological, and 
economic domains of Iran, to a degree that overrides any other known military or 
paramilitary force or security apparati worldwide. Over the past thirty years, the 
pathological state of civil–military relations in Iran contributed to the formation of a 
Pasdaran corporate identity, strengthening its capabilities and creating potential 
 
1 In Farsi, Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Englab Eslami. Hereafter, in this text the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps will be called the Pasdaran, the corps, the guards or the IRGC. 
2 Two comparative historical examples to mention are the SS establishment in Nazi Germany during 
World War II and the Republican Guard that existed before the regime change in Iraq. 
3 For an example of a “traditional” point of view, see Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 175–176. 
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incentives, if not outright designs, to take over the state.  The IRGC represents a 
fascinating and symbolic case of malfunction in civil–military relations in general and of 
civilian control in particular, thus providing an inspiring subject of study. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to challenge the still-widespread perception that 
paints the IRGC as a tool at the disposal of the theocratic regime and state. That view was 
indeed relevant in the recent past stages in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Instead, this thesis argues that the corps is currently sidelining its civilian principal—the 
clerical regime—and steadily moving to where it might be able to establish control de 
facto over the key segments and nodes of the state. The thesis supports an emerging 
alternative view that the current clergy-centered system is devolving into a facade for a 
“creeping coup” by the guards.4 
Accordingly, this thesis addresses the following puzzle: How was the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps able to challenge the power of its civilian principals, when it 
was merely created as a “trusted agent,” delegated with domestic security missions? In 
other words, what chain of events and set of factors led to the rise of the corps as a major 
actor and stakeholder in the Islamic Republic of Iran?  
This thesis argues that the rise of the Pasdaran was essentially an unintended 
consequence of its having been delegated many functions by the ruling regime (mainly 
by the clergy establishment). The regime’s motives were to assure its own existence and 
achieve political and ideological goals, both domestic and foreign. However, this 
excessive empowerment, with its associated privileges, impunity, and freedom of action, 
as well as the secrecy, lack of transparency, and unaccountability it was afforded, created 
a breach in civil–military relations in Iran. This, in turn, shaped the corps into a self-
contained, elitist corporation and propelled it into the center of Iranian politics—
eventually setting the preconditions for a potential takeover of the state.  
Accordingly, the problem in question will be treated and analyzed primarily as a 
phenomenon in civil–military relations (CMR) rather than through the prism of domestic, 
 
4 Michael Slackman, “Hard-Line Force Extends Grip over a Splintered Iran,” New York Times, July 
21, 2009, A.1. 
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regional, or international politics. Other related issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program, 
state support to terrorism, meddling in Iraq, and other high-profile issues, although cited, 
are not the subject-matter of this thesis. 
This study advances the proposition that excessive empowerment of the corps was 
a result of corrupt, poorly functioning, mishandled civil–military relations in Iran, 
particularly in the areas of civilian control and national-security decision making. Though 
CMR is mismanaged by the regime in different ways, one component is especially 
important in contributing to the Pasdaran’s ascendance. This component is interservice 
rivalry—a commonplace reality within the military domain that skillful civilian 
principals use as an effective technique of CMR management—but which, in Iran, was 
either misused or not used at all.   
This mismanagement of CMR is a sub-product of Iran’s complex system of power 
and politics. Its hallmarks are the centrality of a single figure (the IRI supreme leader), 
the predominance of politico-ideological (religious) paradigms, the creation of hollow 
institutions, the exaggerated importance of personal relationships, and the existence of a 
constellation of informal groups, networks, and centers of power, driven by competition 
and rivalry. These factors led to the emergence of the IRGC as the dominant actor of 
defense and security sector in Iran with the established privileged relations with the 
supreme leader and his allies. These relations have evolved to a level of symbiosis; the 
corps has pledged its hard-power support and loyalty in exchange for endorsement and 
material incentives. The primary interlocutor on behalf of the IRGC in these symbiotic 
relations with the leader is an elitist-corporate group of acting and former servicemen 
with high governmental or social status (informally known as the corps’ “alumni”).5 This 
alliance is wrapped in a veil of politico-ideological sanctimony due to the IRGC’s official 
role as the “guardians of the revolution” and justifying its upgraded status. At the same 
time, other peers from the defense and security sector, foremost among them the regular 
 
5 The notion of the IRGC alumni was developed in several sources and gradually became used in 
analytical discourse, though the initial source of this definition is not established. For example, see: Reza 
Zarabi, “The Sepah Pasdaran: Changing Tides in Iran’s Power Paradigm,” Global Politics 6 (May 16, 
2008), http://www.global-politics.com/issue6/Zarabi (accessed January 3, 2010).  
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army (a.k.a. the Artesh),6 are sidelined or even suppressed. This gulf between the corps 
and the “others” is observable in different fields of interservice rivalry, such as influence 
over security, foreign policies, information and intelligence, and war doctrines, as well as 
competition over institutional capabilities, responsibilities, and resources. In all these 
fields of rivalry, the corps is entrenched as the prevailing force. In the absence of checks 
and balances provided by equally strong, competing services and agencies, the corps is 
emboldened by almost unrestrained freedom of action.   
The factors contributing into the increase of the IRGC’s role are: (i) its 
empowerment by the supreme leader; (ii) its inherent political role, granted upon its 
creation and amplified by further politicization; (iii) its corporatism and separate 
institutional identity; and (iv) a virtual absence of the checks, balances and governmental 
levers of influence that are the product of sustained interservice rivalry. The IRGC’s 
powers were granted intentionally. All these factors have led to unintended and perhaps 
unanticipated outcome. 
The main argument of this thesis is that the regime violated the core principle of 
interservice rivalry, which is equal treatment of all participants. By the permanent, one-
sided privileging of the IRGC, the regime, or more precisely, its dominant faction, 
deprived itself of an effective lever and created an environment where no other service or 
agency, individually or together, is in a position to counterweight or contain the corps. 
This distorted, politicized, and uneven interservice rivalry has crippled the CMR dynamic 
and triggered the strategic politics currently observed in Iran. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
A number of policy and theoretical issues justify this thesis. From the policy 
perspective, given that the growing role of the IRGC corporate elite is far beyond its own 
institutional framework, the study of the Pasdaran phenomenon will provide an 
understanding of current and future dynamics in Iran and its region, especially in light of 
 
6 The regular army (or Artesh in Farsi) in Iranian discourse refers to a regular armed forces, consisting 
of the ground, air, and naval forces. Subsequently, both terms (army and Artesh) are used in the text exactly 
in this meaning.  
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the Iranian nuclear quest and defiant international behavior. A civil-military relations 
problem, which once originated domestically in Iran, may now have broader regional and 
international implications. In other words, if Iran emerges as a serious international 
challenge, the IRGC will be at the very heart of it. 
From a theoretical point of view—though at a glance the case in focus appears to 
be an isolated phenomenon concerning a rare type of political regime (theocracy), as well 
as a product of Iran’s unique military dualism7—the study is still relevant for a number 
of reasons. First, it provides insights in identifying patterns of CMR in nondemocratic 
(authoritarian) regimes, whereas the current literature concentrates primarily on 
democracies or states in transition, leaving “the rest” largely out of consideration. 
Second, the study of the IRGC phenomenon provides an opportunity to understand how 
excessive empowerment eventually corporatizes military elites by providing strong 
incentives to concentrate more power. Third, the case in question provides insights about 
the politicization and indoctrination of the military and security forces within a regime 
(otherwise known as subjective civilian control) and its unintended consequences. Fourth, 
it illustrates how overdependence on the part of a regime that is focused on a survivalist 
agenda enables its protectors to defeat the notion of civilian control. Fifth, it helps in 
evaluating how tools of military influence (such as information asymmetry, doctrinal 
monopoly, and institutional autonomy) deform interaction between the governments and 
the militaries in the field national-security decision-making. Sixth, it identifies patterns 
and techniques for bypassing, overcoming, or mitigating civilian checks and balances. 
There are additional reasons for pursuing this study as well. The role of 
paramilitary forces in general—their positioning within a political regime and 
relationships with other institutions such as the regular armed forces—has not been 
sufficiently explored.8 More particularly, the study of CMR in Iran is an unexplored and 
 
7 The phenomenon of the Iranian military dualism is based on the existence of two parallel forces (the 
regular armed forces and IRGC) and elaborated in more detail in Chapter III of the thesis. 
8 Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago & London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1977), ix. 
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neglected field;9 “many studies of the Iranian military have failed to take into account the 
relationship between the military establishment and the state apparatus.”10 It is modestly 
hoped that this research will partially bridge this gap.   
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The research question and hypothesis were inspired by certain concepts in the 
CMR literature. Civil–military relations are a broad category in social science, and some 
social-science theories are applied. However, this analysis will focus primarily on 
interservice rivalry and certain ideas in this regard as developed by Samuel P. 
Huntington,11 Kenneth Allard,12 and Richard K. Betts,13 among others. 
Despite the pejorative connotation associated with the term, interservice rivalry is 
not necessarily a negative or harmful phenomenon.14 Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, rivalry does not undermine civilian control over the military forces and its 
services. Quite the opposite: a “transition from civilian-service controversy to 
interservice controversy as the main focus of service political activity” has a direct and 
positive impact on CMR, by making a “potential conflict between civil and military 
institutions…sublimated and deflected into conflict among the services. Interservice 
controversy is substituted for civil-military controversy.”15 Civil authorities use division  
 
and friction between the services for purposes of control in almost every modern state, 
 
9 Ahmed S. Hashim, “Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Joseph A. 
Kechichian, ed., Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 31–32. 
10 Babak Ganji, “Civil-Military Relations, State Strategies and Presidential Elections in Iran,” Conflict 
Studies Research Centre at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Middle East 05/26 (June 2005), 
1, http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/middle-east/05(26)-BG.pdf (accessed July 24, 
2009). 
11 Samuel P. Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 
The American Political Science Review 55, no 1 (March 1961), 40–52. 
12 Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University, 1996).  
13 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
14 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 40, and 
Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 8.  
15 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 41. 
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notwithstanding the type of political regime,16 using disagreement to “keep a maximum 
number of strategy choices and policy options.17 
The sources of interservice rivalry vary. They are largely shaped by the domains 
of warfare a service operates in (land, air, or sea) and the weapons used.18 Different ways 
of war result in differing professional and operational cultures and contrasting 
perspectives on division of labor and priorities of roles, missions and capabilities.19 
Differences over budgets and procurements naturally follow.20  
Interservice rivalry is essentially a tension between the need for synergistic effort 
from the military forces as a whole versus the individual services’ need to maintain 
internal loyalty and protect organizational interests (autonomy, status, levels, and 
missions).21 The key areas under discussion will be command and control, division of 
labor, doctrine, and finances.22 It is important to note that division and rivalry take place 
not only among services, but within them as well.23 The actors behind intra-service 
rivalry are the “elite nuclei” and informal groupings that can provide additional levers of 
influence to civilian principals.24 
The various ideologies of the services (particularly as reflected in their 
strategicand tactical doctrines) play an important role in driving rivalry.25 They are 
linked to a given geostrategic environment and nature of present threats. Depending on 
those threats, a service might gain the advantage in determining national-security 
 
16 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 42. 
17 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises, 117. 
18 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 41, and 
Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises, 122. 
19 Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 4–6. 
20 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 40, and 
Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises, 117. 
21 Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 8, and Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 
Cold War Crises, 117–118. 
22 Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 15, and Huntington, “Interservice 
Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 40. 
23 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises, 126. 
24 Ibid., 127. 
25 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises, 117. 
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strategy. For instance, the U.S. Air Force dominated the field of national strategy 
between 1945 and 1961, when the need to contain communism was paramount. By 
contrast, the U.S. Army largely determined the strategies and policies of 1961 to 1972, 
the period of the Vietnam War.26 Still, at least in democratic political settings, “changes 
in service interests and ideologies are more likely to derive from civilian policy changes 
than to determine it.”27 Among the major drivers of interservice rivalries are the services’ 
separate identities. Those identities are shaped by tradition and a “profound historical 
legacy” that produces intellectual and psychol
Most certainly, interservice rivalry has disadvantages, such as duplication, high 
cost, and friction,29 which might affect the operational (i.e., war-fighting) effectiveness 
of the armed forces.30 However, the benefits of civil–military relations in general—and 
for those exercising civilian control in particular—is still greater.31 While politically 
weakening the armed forces as a whole through rivalry, the civilian authority strengthens 
the motivation of the individual services to act as responsible, restrained political players 
and thus promote their own interests.32  
Western theory is not always helpful in assessing CMR phenomena in other parts 
of the world, especially in developing countries with nondemocratic political regimes. 
Indeed the literature on such is relatively scarce, yet it is possibe to recognize certain 
patterns and trends in the Mid-Eastern region in general and Iran in particular. In the 
settings mentioned above, interservice rivalry as a CMR management technique is 
implemented in the form of military dualism, or dichotomy (i.e., the creation of twin 
military forces with disparate statuses). One manifestation of such a policy is a formation 
 
26 Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Cold War Crises, 122–125. 
27 Ibid., 126. 
28 Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 8-10. 
29 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 40. 
30 Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, 1. 
31 Huntington, “Interservice Competition and the Political Roles of the Armed Services,” 42. 
32 Ibid., 44. 
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of “highly ideological parallel military structures.”33 Those paramilitary “ideological 
militias” are closely linked with authoritarian states concerned about the loyalty of their 
militaries. The militias are intended to balance the regular defense forces. However, at a 
certain point the distinction and separation between the regular and paramilitary forces in 
performing external defense and internal (political) security missions might become 
blurred, or altered in favor of the paramilitary force, especially at the post-revolutionary, 
stabilization stage.34 The creation of a parallel paramilitary branch to provide checks and 
balances against the regular military launches a spiral of competition, involving the 
establishment as de facto tool of political struggle at the disposal of different groups 
within the regime. This competition in turn amplifies already existing interservice friction 
and affects civil–military relations.35 Since the concern over the regime’s survival from 
internal threats becomes predominant, its policy towards the military turns towards 
strengthening the components and nodes of interservice rivalry, which weakens its 
defensive capability.36  
Notwithstanding these differences, interservice rivalry, if applied rightly, becomes 
an effective management tool over the defense and security sector. It helps reduce the 
excessive political energy of the military establishment by redirecting it into narrow 
professional competition. It gives an opportunity to create a system of mutual checks and 
balances. Finally, it gives the civil authority an effective lever with which to influence 
military organizations. 
 
33 Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” 
Political Science Quarterly 115, no 1 (Spring 2000), 82-87, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2658034 (accessed 
08/13/2009). 
34 Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, 30. 
35 Hashim, “Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 37–38, 51, and Risa Brooks, 
“Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” in Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, eds., The Future 
Security Environment in the Middle East: Conflict, Stability and Political Change (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2004), 129–162. 
36 Barry Rubin, “The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics,” in Barry Rubin and Thomas A. 
Keaney, eds., Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002), 2, 5–9. 
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D. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
The thesis is structured as follows: the introduction in Chapter I, Chapter II places 
the IRGC in a strategic context, tracing the underlying causes and patterns of the corps’ 
emergence, empowerment and ascendancy through different stages: the revolution 
(1979–1980), the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988), the “Second Republic” (1988–1997), the 
“Third Republic” (1997–2005), and the “Fourth Republic” (since 2005). The chapter 
concludes with a summary of findings.  
Chapter III provides an overview of the national-security system, decision-making 
process, and tools of civilian control. The emphasis is the flaws and pathologies of the 
system that have made the IRGC able to overcome the engines of control and operate as 
an independent and influential actor.  
Chapter IV presents a focused case study of a selected slice of CMR and civilian 
control: the domain of interservice rivalry between Iran’s military forces. It addresses the 
issue of services’ identities and institutional cultures as sources of difference and rivalry 
between them, traces the origins and nature of rivalry between the IRGC and its 
competitors throughout different periods of time. It also provides an analysis of this 
rivalry in fields such as national-security strategy, foreign policy, intelligence, military 
doctrine, institutional influences, and competition for resources.  Finally, it addresses the 
societal aspects of the rivalry. 
Chapter V follows with a summation and conclusion, including findings and 
possible scenarios in relation to the issues in focus.  
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II. CORPS: THE “GRAND PICTURE” 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Iranian people trace their national identity back three millennia, and military 
tradition is deeply rooted in the culture.37 Multiple wars, always imminent due to Iran's 
location and history, through the centuries have promoted a societal respect and piety 
toward the military profession in Iran. Military force was the mainstay of power for 
ruling dynasties. However, since Iran has emerged as a nation-state in the modern history, 
the military never performed as an independent actor, nor intervened in political 
processes. Even in 1953, when the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces (IIAF) staged a coup 
to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh,38 it acted at the 
behest of the shah, the supreme commander in chief. In some previous and post-coup 
cases, the military performed as an object rather than a subject of politics, loyal first to 
the monarchy and only then to the state.39 Such nonengagement in politics earned the 
military the nickname “the Big Mute” in Iranian society.40 This factor played one of the 
crucial roles in the collapse of the throne in 1979. 
The Islamic Revolution of 1978–1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, was one of the 
major tectonic, sociopolitical shifts of the latter third of the past century.41 During the 
revolution, the army did little to save the monarchy, though mass popular uprising was 
 
37 Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2009), 1–10. 
38 Michael Barutciski, “Iran,” in Karl DeRouen Jr. and Uk Heo, eds., Defense & Security: A 
Compendium of National Armed Forces & Security Policies, vol. 1, (Santa Barbara CA, Denver CO, 
Oxford UK: ABC-CLIO Inc, 2005), 307. 
39 Michael Rubin, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guard – a Rogue Outfit?,” The Middle East Quarterly xv, no 
4 (Fall 2008), http://www.meforum.org/1990/irans-revolutionary-guards-a-rogue-outfit (accessed July 15, 
2009). 
40 Amir Taheri, “The Monster and Cinderella.” Al-Arabiya.com, October 16, 2009, 
http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2009/10/16/88272.html (accessed October 31, 2009).  However, the 
opposite view that portrays the Iranian military as always been a political force. For example see: Hashim, 
“Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 33. 
41 For more details on the revolution see: “Iranian Revolution at 30,” The Middle East Institute Special 
Viewpoint (2009), http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Iran_Final.pdf (accessed November 1, 2009).  
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treated with continuous use of deadly force throughout the months of unrest. A military 
government was imposed in November 1978 in a futile effort to end the upheaval by 
means of the iron fist.42 However, the departure of the shah abroad in January 1979 
deeply demoralized the military elite,43 groomed by the monarch, but disconnected both 
from society and reality. The IIAF rapidly crumbled, especially due to the 
revolutionaries’ ability to drive a wedge between the upper- and junior-officer corps and 
amid ranks already divided by social-class affiliation.44 The uprising of the air-force 
warrant officers and technicians in Tehran on February 9, 1979, correlated with a claim 
of neutrality by the IIAF top commanders, stated at the meeting of the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces two days later,45 made the victory of the revolution irreversible. On 
February 11, 1979, the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed.  
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps was a child of the Islamic Revolution. 
Created for the protection of the new Islamic republic, in thirty years it went through an 
unprecedented evolution. One outcome was that the corps became the first military force 
in modern Iranian history to operate as an independent player with the potential to take 
over the state. To understand the present and assess the future, one must review the past. 
This chapter traces the Pasdaran’s ascendancy to show how power was gained, as 
analyzed from the perspective of civil–military relations.  
B. POST-REVOLUTIONARY STAGE (1979–1980): INCEPTION 
In the immediate post-revolutionary stage, the new regime that emerged from the 
rubble of monarchy represented an unlikely alliance of different political factions and 
forces, facing four complex and interrelated security challenges: to reestablish and 
maintain order; to keep the country from falling apart; to prevent an anticipated military 
coup by the perceived pro-monarchy elements left over in the top army command; and to 
 
42 Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, 218. 
43 Hashim, “Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 36. 
44 Mark Roberts, “Khomeini’s Incorporation of the Iranian Military,” McNair Papers 48, National 
Defense University (1996), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/mcnair/mcnair48/mcnair48.pdf (accessed July 26, 
2009), 13. 
45 Hashim, “Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 37. 
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severe the link between regrouping monarchists abroad and any revisionist forces inside 
the country. In other words, the new regime desperately needed to keep disruptive 
elements and potential opposition under control, the army down, and monarchists out. To 
fulfill this mission, the Islamic government required a trusted security force, which it 
would need to create.   
At the cumulative stage of the revolution in late 1978 to early 1979, a broad 
variety of paramilitary structures had emerged, such as party militias, urban self-defense 
groups, personal security details, and army defectors' groups. After the overthrow of the 
monarchy, in the midst of an enduring mess and rapidly exacerbating struggle for power 
between secular and religious trends within the new regime, hard-line Islamic factions 
were able to rapidly intercept an agenda and fill the power vacuum by creating their own 
enforcement “triad,” encompassing the revolutionary committees (command and control 
structures), revolutionary tribunals (law enforcement), and vigilantes. The latter consisted 
primarily, but not only, of radical university students or members of the lower class who 
had been recruited into the revolutionary movement, providing muscle for the two first 
legs of the triad. On May 5, 1979, these groups were merged as the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps, which was officially endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini on December 4, 
1979.46 An official institutionalization gave the corps formal legitimization. Within 
months of its creation, the corps was already heavily engaged in the political processes, 
taking part in the repression of monarchist and other opposition elements as well as 
suppressing the rising separatist movements of ethnic Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens on the 
borders. However, the paramount task for the new force was not just to counterbalance, 
but effectively neutralize the former IIAF (since renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Army).   
 
46 Mahjoob Zweiri, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps: Guardians of Revolutionary Order,” Islam 
Online, October 16, 2007, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c+Article_C&pagename+Zone-
English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout&cid=1190886371485 (accessed December 14, 2009) and Ali 
Alfoneh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Role in the Iranian Politics,” Middle East Quarterly XV, no 4 (Fall 
2008), http://www.aei.org/article/28594 (accessed November 30, 2009).  
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During the revolution, the IIAF was deeply demoralized and effectively 
disintegrated.47 However, though the army command declared its political neutrality and 
accepted the fait accompli, it felt betrayed, disoriented, and humiliated by the need to 
shift loyalty.48 At the same time, the most influential wing of the new regime, associated 
with the clerics, deeply mistrusted the military. Despite of the fact that the army’s 
inaction helped overthrow the monarchy, the military was viewed as an inherently 
counterrevolutionary force, perceived through a lens of anti-Americanism, especially 
because a portion of the officer corps in the previous decade had been trained in the USA 
or by American advisors.49 The new regime dealt with the former shah’s military in an 
extremely radical way, by unfolding a campaign of repression against the higher echelon 
of the officer corps. Hundreds of generals and senior officers were executed, imprisoned, 
prematurely retired, or forced into exile. For instance, to understand the scope of the 
purges, between February 13 and 18, not less than eight top generals faced the firing 
squad, while 156 more generals and admirals were forcibly retired within one week, 
between February 17 and 24 (as estimated in an official media report).50 At the same 
time, junior and inexperienced officers, as well as those retired by the shah for their 
political activities, were pushed into key commands. 
The stress put on the military by spiraling repression, political disarray, and 
consolidation of the opposition, eventually led to the new regime’s obsessive fears of a 
coup d’état becoming materialized in reality. A conspiracy linked to pro-shah emigrants 
abroad and aimed at toppling the government by force (known in the modern Iranian 
political discourse as the Negab plot) was interdicted at an air-force base at a very last 
moment in July 1980, involving a massive use of the Pasdaran to suppress the 
perpetrators.51 The event taught the regime two lessons: first, it verified its worst 
 
47 Roberts, Khomeini’s Incorporation of the Iranian Military (McNair Papers 48). 
48 For more details see, Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, 221–230. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Compiled from: Roberts, “Khomeini’s Incorporation of the Iranian Military,” 26–27. 
51 Babak Ganji, “Civil-Military Relations, State Strategies and Presidential Elections in Iran,” Conflict 
Studies Research Centre at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Middle East 05/26 (June 2005), 
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/middle-east/05(26)-BG.pdf (accessed July 24, 
2009), 2. 
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expectations regarding the military, and second, it proved the high utility of the IRGC as 
a counterbalance and internal-security tool. The corps attained a domestic security role as 
a guarantor of regime survival, creating an initial dependency that it would be able to 
exploit to its own benefit in subsequent stages. Moreover, it emerged as a parallel tier in 
the new defense system of the IRI that irreversibly took its “dual” shape. Within its first 
year of existence, the IRGC grew from 6,000 to 100,000 members.52  
The IRGC, from its very creating, was an indoctrinated force, reflecting the nature 
of the emerging regime, which used religion-centered ideology to control the corps itself 
and the wider audience through it. The politico-ideological modalities of the emerging 
corps were highlighted by its association with the zealous students who participated in 
the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November 1979, many of whom soon 
joined its ranks.53 By 1980, the IRGC became a full-fledged actor on the Iranian political 
stage. Yet, at that period it did not act independently, but rather as a coercive tool at the 
disposal of the rapidly shaping Khomeinist trend within the regime.  
C. WAR (1980–1988): BAPTISM OF FIRE 
In September 1980, Iran was invaded by Iraq; the decision to attack was 
particularly inspired by a perception of the military weakness of the Islamic Republic, as 
revealed by the attempted coup, and a predicted imminent collapse of the regime.54 
Partially, those assumptions proved true, since initially the Iranian army gave some 
ground to the enemy. However, the hard-line clerical factions within the regime used the 
factor of foreign aggression to rally the population around the national cause and 
consequently destroy political foes inside, to strengthen their grip over the country. The 
eight-year war propelled the Pasdaran to a new level. 
The immediate and desperate defensive efforts to hold the crumbling front and 
stop the Iraqi advance required the deployment of the guard units as a conventional 
 
52 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York, NY: 
Random House, 2004), 151. 
53 Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, 236-238. 
54 Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980 - 1988 (Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Osprey Publishing 
Ltd, 2002), 14. 
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fighting force, which they were not initially trained for. The Pasdaran became a major 
contributing factor in the emergence of what is now called the “Iranian way of war.”55 
Though discussion of the operational aspects is not a purpose of this thesis, there are two 
relevant socio-political dimensions. First, the use of poorly trained guard soldiers and 
militiamen from the Basij volunteer force, controlled by the IRGC, for the attacks against 
a well-entrenched enemy who enjoyed overwhelming firepower, led to enormous loss in 
human lives, growing from one campaign to another. The phenomenon of “human 
waves” attacks, not acceptable in Western politico-cultural settings, was common in the 
Iran-Iraq war, being magnified by certain specifics of the Shiite trend of Islam 
emphasizing a “cult of martyrdom.”56 In the post-war period it was translated into the 
widespread fame and popularity of the corps, increasing its social capital. It also helped 
define the asymmetric war-fighting modus operandi that constitutes one of the major 
pillars of current doctrinal dominance of the corps in the field of national defense (as 
discussed in Chapter IV). Furthermore, the existing revolutionary core of the IRGC was 
augmented by the addition of citizen soldiers, due to a mandatory war mobilization and 
Iran's transition into a “nation at arms.” Consequently, the corps gained a strong social 
dimension by fighting in a war that left a deep footprint in the modern Iranian psyche, 
with its draft soldiers who were brought from every corner of the country and represented 
all but one of its social strata and ethnic groups. The war expanded the future societal 
outreach of the corps. 
Even more important for the topic of this research, the war coined the institutional 
and corporate identity of the Pasdaran. The members who joined the corps at the wave of 
revolution shortly before the war, under the call of the religious leaders, were mostly 
young men in their early 20s (i.e., student aged) with limited life experience. The war 
shaped their beliefs, visions, and philosophy, broadly enhancing their practical 
 
55 For details see, William D. Bryant, The Iranian Way of War, (Maxwell, AL: School of Advanced 
Air & Space Studies at Air University, 2007). 
56 For explanation and more details see, Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War 
(London, UK and New York, NY: Routledge, 1988), 140-141, and Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War 1980 - 1988, 
39. 
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knowledge and skills.57 The latter meant a de facto professionalization. However, the 
first-generation Pasdaran was self-professionalized in the school of battle (learning by 
fighting) rather than in military academies. All acting and former members of the IRGC 
alumni, placed currently in top positions in the state and security establishment, are 
graduates of the battlefield. Thus, the professionalization of the corps occurred not 
through “civilianization” of the military, as in Western-type democracies, but to the 
contrary, through the militarization of a large mass of people with an essentially civilian 
background (this issue will be addressed in more detail in Chapter IV). During the war, 
the corps achieved its institutional ego and corporate identity, realizing itself as an entity. 
Henceforth the terms “corps,” “IRGC,” and “Pasdaran,” depending on the context, are 
used in this text to identify not only the institution itself, but also the “corporation”—a 
broader category of individuals who left it technically, yet remaining tied by political, 
ideological, and spiritual affiliation. 
The war caused a paradoxical effect on the relations between the Pasdaran and 
Artesh. On one side, it helped close the gap between the ranks and junior officers of both 
Iranian military systems fighting for the national cause, and even to create a spirit of 
solidarity and comradeship. On the other hand, it generated mounting friction over 
operational conduct and overall strategy between the army command and the IRGC 
commanders. Since the Iraqi advance had stalled by 1981, the immediate threat of defeat 
had therefore waned. Consequently, the struggle for power between the secular and 
clerical groupings within Iranian leadership, which had diminished during the invasion, 
erupted again. This rift obviously affected the course of war by placing domestic political 
considerations ahead of effective strategy (as illustrated in Chapter IV). In 1986 the 
IRGC the radical clergy from the other part of regime, supported by hawkish guard 
commanders, were able, over the objection of the army, to convince Ayatollah Khomeini, 
the IRI supreme leader, to commit resources into a massive last effort against Iraq.58 
However, the “year of the last offensive” claimed in January 1987, turned into a disaster 
 
57 Farideh Fahri, “The Antinomies of Iran’s War Generation,” in Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, 
ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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with no gains and dozens of thousands of deaths. Iraq not only endured but was able to 
deliver substantial blows to the Iranians. In August 1988, Iran had to accept reality and 
agree on a ceasefire, thus putting the war to an end.  
Politicization of the war strategy and the associated decision-making process 
provided the corps more clout, and in particular led to an institutional expansion of the 
corps. While formally remaining a paramilitary entity in status, it was organizationally 
spread into a tri-service conventional military structure by 1985.59 The war indicated 
emergence of the IRGC influence on the war-fighting doctrines and decision-making 
process that is still enjoyed now.  
The war period added to the IRGC's role one more important feature. When Israel 
invaded Lebanon in summer 1982, large numbers of corps members were deployed as 
“volunteers” to fight the “Zionist enemy” at the behest of the regime, who identified it as 
another rallying cause for the nation.60 For the first time the corps tested the waters of the 
covert and overt revolutionary missions abroad that soon became its trademark and 
created a high degree of influence on the entire security and foreign policy of the IRI.  
 D. THE “SECOND REPUBLIC” (1988–1997): CONSOLIDATION  
The end of a protracted war of attrition with Iraq and the death of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1989 were a critical junction in Iran’s history. The closure of a decade of 
post-revolutionary mess and wartime suffering brought to the a forefront the need for 
political stabilization and economic rebuilding, which became the primary task of 
President A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who served two consecutive terms from 1989 till 1997. 
In this period, for the first time, the regime demonstrated some signs of fear of the 
radicalism of the guard, which had become resurgent in its strength and morale during the 
conflict with Iraq.61 As in many other historical cases of unsuccessful wars, the emergent 
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61 Ali Alfoneh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Role in the Iranian Politics.” 
 19
                                                
task was to control thousands of seasoned and zealous, but disaffected, veterans, 
subordinate to empowered generals. This task was fulfilled in several ways. 
The first step was a gradual demobilization of the draftees and flushing of war 
volunteers from the ranks. Simultaneously, the government detached the mobilization 
force Basij from the IRGC structure to limit its power. Further, it restrained the 
institutional framework of the guards, disbanding in the process the bureaucratic tug-of-
war its ministry created in 1982.62 And most important, the Hashemi-Rafsanjani 
government turned back again towards the Artesh. The army had been exonerated by its 
brave and professional conduct during the war,63 cleared of its pro-monarchy stigma, and 
was now viewed as a counterbalance to the guards (i.e., almost the mirror of the situation 
less than a decade earlier). One of the indicators of the resurgent role of the regular army, 
perhaps, was that most of the new weapons purchased abroad during that period, were 
transferred to its control, while the Pasdaran mostly retained war trophies taken from 
Iraq.64  
Yet, these quite short sticks came in packages with long carrots. The way chosen 
to keep the radical guard elements disenchanted by the war's outcome at bay and to 
prevent them from turning against the regime, reflected the specifically cultural 
dimension of Iran. The key Guards commanders were awarded with lucrative economic 
opportunities arising from the launch of a massive rebuilding and reconstruction 
campaign.65 Arranged through specially created funds (known in Farsi as bonyads),66 the 
campaign was essentially a distribution of reconstruction contracts and financial credits 
on the basis of political loyalty. It was supervised personally by Ayatollah Ali 
 
62 Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1993), 105. 
63 Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces, 304-305. 
64 Frederick Kagan, “Security Structures of Iran,” Iran Tracker, February 20, 2009, 
http://www.irantracker.org/basics/security-structures-iran (accessed December 12, 2009). 
65 Ali Alfoneh, “How Intertwined are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?” Iran Tracker, 
October 22, 2007, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/how-intertwined-are-revolutionary-guards-irans-
economy (accessed October 18, 2009). 
66 Bobby Gosh, “Iran’s Quiet Coup,” Time, October 5, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1924402,00.html (accessed October 11, 2009). 
 20
                                                
Khamenei,67 who replaced Khomeini as supreme leader. This process marked the 
beginning of the accumulation of fiscal resource and material wealth (later reinvested into 
other fields) by the emerging corps’ elite. This new elite was represented by the active 
service officers in the command echelon and those retired guardsmen (mostly young 
people still in their 30s, from the urban lower class) who left the service for civilian 
opportunities yet kept intact their ties with comrades in arms and the institutional identity 
shaped by war. The economic windfall of the early and mid–90s was significant in the 
empowerment of the Corps for three reasons. It marked the beginning of its power as an 
oligarchy, strengthened its social significance, and began the crucial relational link 
between the guards’ alumni and the supreme leader.68  
The reasons for emergence of “deep and symbiotic” relationships69 between the 
IRGC and the new supreme leader were political. Khamenei, being less powerful, having 
no such strong sacral aura as his predecessor Ayatollah Khomeini, and dealing with 
strong politicians such as Rafsanjani, needed a strong ally. In exchange for its pledged 
loyalty, the corps apparently got material incentives, simultaneously maximizing its 
maneuverability on the domestic political field. The first indicators of the corps taking 
sides in the atmosphere of growing friction between the Khamnei and Hashemi-
Rafsanjani followed public criticism of the president’s policy as “deviant from the 
revolutionary course.”70 
Most likely, close relations with the supreme leader were key in overcoming 
government attempts to impose institutional control over the guards. After the 
disbandment of its ministry, the corps was subordinated directly to Khamenei. Though 
deprived of its territorial mobilization wing (the Basij), the IRGC retained 125,000 
uniformed men in three services, a special-operations branch, and an emerging 
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intelligence organization.71 The postwar fixation of the IRGC structure as a parallel 
conventional war machine, with the whole range of associated command and control, 
training, logistical, and other associated infrastructures, led to an emergence of a corps’ 
bureaucracy, in a departure from a revolutionary towards a more formalized 
establishment.  
That said, this was true only on an organizational side, since the politico-religious 
indoctrination of IRGC personnel and the regime security-assurance task both remained 
intact. It is proved by the continuous and even increasing participation of corps’ elements 
in covert actions, operations, and “revolutionary” missions abroad. Among them was the 
alleged participation of the corps’s covert operations wing in a series of assassinations of 
prominent Iranian opposition leaders abroad.72 Furthermore, corps personnel in the 90s 
were continuously involved in ideologically-justified missions in support of the 
“revolutionary movements” in many places, ranging from Sudan to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.73 
Thus, during the postwar-recovery decade, the corps reached the next stage of 
power. Despite the humiliation associated with the failure of  the “victorious war” 
lobbied by radicals in the corps command, it assured the corps' institutional survival, 
overcame timid government attempts to impose a sort of control, and not only retained, 
but even strengthened, cohesion. More importantly, the corps successfully forged 
privileged relations with the new supreme leader.  
E. THE “THIRD REPUBLIC” (1997–2005): CAPITALIZATION 
President Mohammad Khatami who replaced Rafsanjani at his post in 1997 and 
also served two consecutive four-year terms, apparently has tried to revise and moderate 
certain aspects of the domestic and foreign policy of the IRI; he is thus viewed as a 
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“reformer” in country and abroad.74 As such, Khatami and his “reformist” team, even 
before assuming office, were treated with suspicion by the supreme leader, the 
conservative factions within the regime, and the IRGC command. Not surprisingly, prior 
to elections, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohsen Rezai endorsed an internal order to 
guards’ personnel to vote for a hardline candidate.75  
Soon after the election, the new government was sucked into a political crisis, 
caused on one side by a growing social demand for change, and on the other, by the 
increasing resistance of conservative forces. Caught in the middle, the Khatami 
government tried to contain the growing pressure from the security establishment, using 
legal procedures. For example, the serial killings of several prominent figures associated 
with the political opposition in 1998–2000 revealed a role of the Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security behind them.76 This gave Khatami a chance to purge the top echelon of the 
MOIS that had gained so much notoriety during the post-revolutionary repressions and 
was regarded as a “bastion of hardliners” and an obstacle to the reformist course 77. The 
partial subduing of the MOIS and diminishment of its role for the first time since the 
revolution was objectively in favor of the corps, who competed with the MOIS in the 
fields of intelligence gathering, decision making, influence on leadership, and other 
aspects of clout. Thus, government action against the MOIS caused an additional non-
intended empowerment of the Pasdaran. 
However, he was not willing or able to conduct the same restraining procedure 
with the IRGC. The failure to address the issue of control and sideline the conservative 
elements of corps command caused a serious backlash very soon. At the peak of mass 
student protests in the capital and other major cities in the summer of 1999, rallying 
under a demand of change, the corps undertook its first overt intervention into politics, 
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causing the major crisis in CMR since the Islamic Revolution.78 On July 19, 1999, a 
conservative newspaper published an open letter to President Khatami signed by twenty-
four top IRGC commanders, both acting and retired.79 The document issued an explicit 
warning to the president to follow the “line of the Imam” (i.e., Khomeini). The “Letter of 
Twenty-Four” urged Khatami to put an end to the ongoing political upheavals and 
expressed a determination to intervene in the process, if necessary. The document 
effectively imposed a grid of restrictions on the “reformist” agenda and defined a 
restrictive field of maneuver for the president. The following violent crackdown of the 
student movement by paramilitary forces clearly indicated the prevalence of conservative 
factions within the regime. 
The internal crises of the late 90s to early 00s, as well as other developments 
associated with the activities of the “reformist” government, apparently taught a major 
lesson to the IRGC establishment. It realized that the political course of Iran might be 
altered through the legal electoral process, affecting major interests of the regime’s 
conservative wing. To prevent such a scenario and to intercept its cause, the corps 
increasingly invested its efforts and available political, financial, and cadre resources 
(i.e., relationship with the supreme leader, generated money, and the IRGC “alumni” 
members) into elections. The ultimate goal was attaining legislative influence. The IRGC 
started positioning itself firmly in the political sphere by inserting its alumni’s members, 
linked through preserved esprit de corps, indoctrination anchors, and personal ties. The 
major effort of this strategy effort was focused on the legislative domain at its provincial 
and national levels. This effort was increased after the reelection of President Khatami for 
the second term in 2001.80 The first manifestation of the emerging shift occurred during 
the 2003 municipal elections, where guard candidates got many slots in the local province 
and city councils. The next year, in elections to parliament, the alumni won an estimated 
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eighty of 290 seats in the top national legislative body.81 This gain enhanced the 
previously generated administrative resource, since an estimated thirty-four former IRGC 
officers were already placed in senior posts in the executive branch by 2004.82 
These internal developments in Iran were associated with the major post-9/11 
shifts in the global and regional geopolitical and security environment that decisively 
reshaped the Iranian strategic vision and threat perceptions.83 More specifically, 
intervention in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime in 2001 and the war on Iraq 
to topple the Saddam Hussein regime resulted in the establishment of a long-lasting and 
significant U.S. military presence in the areas surrounding Iran. Coupled with certain 
political actions and statements, such as the inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil” by the 
USA, the perception was generated within most factions of the regime that the IRI would 
likely become the next target for American military action.84 Though such a view 
changed by 2005 (after the U.S. bogged down in Iraq) it reinforced the hawks in the 
political and security establishment, primarily in the IRGC, who advocated a more 
proactive posture to interdict such developments. The major Iranian response 
concentrated on Iraq, which was quite rightly defined as the center of gravity of the U.S. 
effort in the region. The corps emerged as a major driver behind this strategy and 
subsequently was defined as a “lead agency” in the Iraqi theatre. The mass infiltration of 
pro-Iranian proxy groups and the meddling into post-Saddam Iraq was managed by the 
IRGC.85 This example illustrates an unusual use of what is still regarded as a 
paramilitary internal-security force for a complex and high-stakes external mission. The 
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launch of a “preemptive” Iranian campaign in Iraq furthermore extended IRGC clout 
within the regime concerned by a perceived strateg
In an associated development, the corps has emerged as a primary overseer and 
supervisory agency for the presumably weapon-oriented nuclear program of the IRI, 
whose existence was publicly revealed in 2004 by the Iranian opposition.86 Linked with 
increasing ballistic-missile capabilities (i.e., potential weapons-of-mass-destruction 
delivery means that fell solely under order of battle to the IRGC,87 in another departure 
from the conventional painting of the Pasdaran as an internal-security force), the corps 
effectively became a strategic factor from the international perspective. 
Thus, the growing sense of insecurity, “strategic envelopment,” and shadow of 
anticipated invasion due to the American military influx into the Gulf region in the 
aftermath of the 9/11, was effectively overplayed by the corps establishment. It was used 
to alter regime’s foreign-policy behavior, manipulate threat perceptions, and amplify 
security dilemmas.88 The practical gains of the IRGC were its increasing institutional 
autonomy, growing dependence of the government on the corps’ professional expertise, 
and sidelining of other services and agencies in the process of decision-making in the 
field of national security. The negative outcome of such development was emerged 
information asymmetry and doctrinal monopoly of the IRGC (as analyzed in more detail 
in chapters III and IV). Consequently, the IRI regime became more dependent on the 
IRGC as a defender and protector, this time from the external existential threat. Though it 
is hard to assess precisely to what extend the change in the Iranian security environment 
influenced the failure of the “reformist” wing and the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, 
this factor most likely played its important role. 
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The years 1997–2005 apparently was a period of capitalization for the IRGC in 
the major spheres of domestic, foreign and security policy. For the first time, the corps 
intervened in the political process by threat of force, operating not on behalf of any 
regime or faction, but rather as itself, as a corporate entity. The “Letter of Twenty-Four” 
became a moment of truth that clearly indicated that the role of the IRGC was as a 
reactionary and counter-modernizing political force. The culmination of the corps’ 
corporative advancement effort arrived in the June 2005 presidential elections, when 
Mahmud Ahmadinejad, once a low- or mid-rank officer in the IRGC with radical political 
visions and conservative religious beliefs,89 was elected as president of Iran. The 
establishment of the IRGC point man in the presidency became a decisive point in its 
ascendancy. 
F. THE “FOURTH REPUBLIC” (AFTER 2005): EXPANSION 
The presidential election campaign of 2005 became an eloquent indicator of the 
rising political ambitions of the corps. Four of the candidates, – M. Rezai, a former IRGC 
commander (1981–1997), M. Qalibaf, the chief of law-enforcement forces, A. Larijani, a 
secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and M. Ahmadinejad, the mayor of 
Tehran, were high-ranking alumni and Iran–Iraq war veterans.90 The election of 
Ahmadinejad placed an alumnus in the nation’s top executive position, enabling him to 
act as a point man and powerbroker on behalf of the guards. It created a comfortable 
environment for the alumni to start expanding its control of key government positions 
and gradually sideline the ruling elites and competitors in the defense and security 
sectors. Nine of twenty-one members of his first cabinet, proposed by the new president 
after the election and approved by the parliament, were former guardsmen who were 
given portfolios in the defense, commerce, energy, welfare, industries and mines, justice, 
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culture, and Islamic-guidance ministries.91 The important point was that the alumni in the 
parliament influenced the approval process and helped likeminded candidates to pass, 
despite that some of them were unqualified due to lack of professional expertise in 
governance or economics. Thus, the emergent legislative resource (i.e., the parliamentary 
faction created by the 2004 elections) just a year later became converted into an 
administrative resource with the influx of a cohort of former officers and operatives into 
top governmental positions. In addition, many other administrative positions that required 
no approval from the parliament, especially at the provincial level, were filled by former 
guards appointed directly by the president.92  
Gaining from experience, not surprisingly the IRGC accelerated its investment 
effort by expanding its existing foothold in the legislative branch. The March 2008 
parliamentary elections added a number of seats controlled by the alumni. The Council of 
Guardians, a structure that according to the Iranian constitution is in charge of vetting 
candidates, gave obvious privileges to the guards, most likely under direct guidance from 
the supreme leader.93 Another notable indicator of the growing IRGC influence on the 
electoral process was the appointment by Khamenei of IRGC Brigadier General Alireza 
Afshar, who was formally transferred to the structure of the ministry of the interior 
(MOI) to oversee and manage the polls.94 This action marked a departure from a post-
revolutionary tradition of having the MOI in charge of elections management. 
Along with pushing on the legislative front, the IRGC used the opportunity of 
having a former member in the president’s office to launch an aggressive institutional 
expansion campaign, putting pressure on peers in the defense and security sector (i.e., the 
Artesh and MOIS). In 2007 the IRGC managed to reincorporate the Basij territorial 
mobilization force that for almost two decades had existed as a separate entity controlled 
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by appointed clerics and provincial governors, back into its own structure.95 Reclaim of 
the Basij placed under corps control between thirteen and twenty million people.96 The 
corps gained another huge tool of coercive influence that proved its utility in the control 
of opposition unrest in 2009.  
Aspects and patterns of socioeconomic, domestic, and foreign policy under 
Ahmadinejad, and particularly the growth of IRGC clout, were treated with rising 
suspicion, anxiety, and discontent by alternative factions of the regime and segments of 
the population.97 Thus, the essential task of retaining achieved gains came into the 
forefront. By 2009 (the year of the next presidential elections) factions supportive to 
Ahmadinejad started to mobilize its physical, administrative, political, and propaganda 
resources to arrange his reelection to a second term. The effort was ultimately led by the 
corps. The pressure and intimidation campaign against political forces supporting 
alternative candidates was launched months ahead the elections.98 Top commanders sent 
warning messages across the political spectrum.99 For instance, on May 4, 2009, Major 
General Mohammad Ali Jaafari, the IRGC commander, stated that the Basij force, 
transferred back under corps control, should “play a role” in the elections. He especially 
referred to the fact that technically it is not an official part of the armed forces, whose 
participation in the political process is banned by law.100 In another case, Major General 
Hassan Firouzabadi, a chief of joint staff of the armed forces but a guardsman by 
affiliation, openly called for reelection of Ahmadinejad, pledging him institutional 
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support against other candidates.101 To facilitate the desired outcome, an estimated thirty 
percent of corps personnel were deployed with tasks ranging from riot control to vote 
counting (the last point allegedly).102  
The elections of June 12, 2009, in which Ahmadinejad was declared a winner, 
created the most serious and protracted political crisis in Iran since the Islamic 
Revolution. A widening citizen dissent and growing sociopolitical ferment were turned 
into mass street protests against suspected election fraud. The opposition unrest that was 
tacitly supported by counter-elites became entrenched across different segments of the 
regime’s spectrum.103 In the rapidly evolving situation and mounting pressure, the 
regime demonstrated a violent reaction, launching a protester crackdown that was 
executed by Basij units rather than by interior-ministry police and supervised by the 
corps’ command, which obviously got carte blanche from Khamenei. Note that the 
guards, before suppressing the opposition, first sought approval for their display of 
resolve and use of force from the supreme leader. As in 1999, the top Guard commanders 
issued a flurry of political statements with warnings on their determination to “crush any 
revolution”104 and turn against opposition (i.e., counter-elite) candidates accused of 
stirring trouble. For instance, on September 1, 2009, Brigadier General Hejazi, the senior 
IRGC commander, publicly blamed former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami of being 
“part of a plot to overthrow” the supreme leader.105 These facts clearly indicate that the 
IRGC emerged as a major beneficiary of the existing system, rather than just its defender 
in
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others.106 The elections of 2009 and subsequent developments became the tipping point 
in the corps’ meddling with politics. It finally leaped from threats of use of force against 
regime opponents to actual use of force. 
Notwithstanding the political crisis, and even likely because of it, after the 
endorsement of Ahmadinejad by the supreme leader in late summer 2009, the alumni 
accelerated the process of predatory expansion. The set of cabinet appointments of 
September 2009 reduced the number of ministers with IRGC background, compared with 
the first term of Ahmadinejad, leaving additional secondary portfolios to technocrats. 
However, the ministry of energy (i.e., of oil) a key establishment from the standpoint of 
financial opportunities, fell under the guards’ control.107 In an even more important 
development, the head of the ministry of defense and armed-forces logistics, supervising 
both the Artesh and the Pasdaran, Brigadier General M. Najjar (an alumnus himself), 
was transferred to the position of minister of the interior, with his former position given 
to Brigadier General A. Vahidi (also an alumnus)—while the new head of the MOIS 
became Heydar Moslehi (though a mid-rank cleric, he spent most of its career in the 
ranks and is under influence of the guards).108 Thus, after a period of bureaucratic turf 
struggle and institutional tug-of-war, centered on lobbying and convincing the supreme 
leader, the IRGC establishment was able to extend control over its traditional 
competitors—the law enforcement, intelligence, and security services—by inserting 
alumni into command positions. The partial takeover of the MOIS, an agency 
traditionally controlled and headed by clerics since the revolution, reduced an important 
check on the corps’ way of monopolizing domestic and foreign intelligence. Sidelining 
the MOI in such key areas as ballot counts, crisis management, and crackdown on street 
protests raised even more the guards’ utility in the eyes of the supreme leader. The entire 
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defense and security block ministries were placed under alumni control.109 The regime 
was left with less counterbalance options and increased dependency on the guards in 
defense, internal security, and information awareness. 
The complex and tense internal political dynamic in Iran has been developing in 
parallel with the growingly aggressive posture of the Islamic Republic in the international 
arena. The patterns of Iranian international behavior clearly demonstrate how substantial 
is the degree of influence that the Pasdaran exercises in the IRI foreign and security 
policy domains. The IRGC emerged as a primary spoiler in Iraq110 and handler behind 
the increased Iranian support to radical militant movements across the Middle East 
(particularly in Palestine, Lebanon, and, more recently, Afghanistan and Yemen).111 One 
example was the role of the IRGC in advising and supplying the Hezbollah movement in 
Lebanon during its summer 2006 war with Israel.112 These activities were accompanied 
by an increasing rhetorical and practical embrace of asymmetric warfare, proactive 
defense, and retaliation doctrines advocated by the corps command.113 They represented 
an attempt to deter any attack against the developing Iranian nuclear program, which in 
turn reflected the change in threat perceptions in Tehran since 2003: declining fear of 
major invasion and growing anxiety on a potential “surgical” surprise attack, as well as of 
popular revolution and ethnic-minority disturbance at home, sponsored from abroad.114 
The IRGC strategists become a major source of such perceptional shift and successfully 
convince the leadership of the feasibility of the threat. As a result, the corps essentially 
advanced in monopolizing information gathering, decision making, resource allocation, 
and practical implementation of the response. It started to exert a decisive influence on 
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Iranian foreign and security policies through a decision-making process and doctrines 
oriented. The activities of the IRGC in this field were loosely controlled by its civilian 
principals.  
Despite all these turbulent developments, the corps elite and alumni continuously 
exploited the presidency of Ahmadinejad to exponentially build wealth and accelerate 
oligarchical control over key sectors of the national economy. According to some 
estimates, by 2009 they controlled over a hundred companies and enterprises with the 
estimated capital of $12 billion to $15 billion invested across the most profitable 
sectors.115  
The last five years of corps’ history is safe to consider it as a period of overall 
increase in power, influence, significance, and outreach. A previous phase of 
capitalization translated into a phase of expansion. Partial explanation of this phenomenal 
might be found in evolution of the special relations established between corps’ alumni 
and the supreme leader, who represents a center of gravity in the IRI political system. 
That relationship, forged in late ‘80s—early ‘90s, had gradually changed in nuance since 
the emerged dependency of the supreme leader, the conservative right factions of the 
regime, and associated ruling elites on corps protection. The IRGC was allowed to “cross 
the lines” in exchange for security.116 As the present moment, despite the dormant 
political crisis in Iran, Ahmadinejad and the regime forces behind him—the IRGC 
establishment foremost—were able to contain opposition and competing factions, 
maintain situational control, and increase indirect influence on the supreme leader. 
Overall, the IRGC fully exploited the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their 
position.117  
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Within thirty years of its creation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps of Iran 
conducted an impressive and unparalleled political ascendancy. Initially it was created 
just as a paramilitary force within the defense and security pool to support the new 
regime as it established itself after taking the power. As such, it did not differ initially 
from its many analogs existing in third-world countries, especially within non-democratic 
political systems. However, the Corps surpassed its initial role and meaning, due to a 
unique context of internal and external developments surrounding Iran, in general, and 
because of constant empowerment by a regime concerned with survival, in particular. As 
a result, most likely unintended, at the certain stage the “incorporated” corps developed 
an identity as a key stakeholder in contemporary Iran, anchored by accumulated power 
and wealth. The clerical regime is gradually becomes de facto sidelined, being dependent 
on protection from IRGC and left just as a source of legitimacy and ideology. The corps 
became a force for the status-quo, willing to violently suppress any attempt to change the 
regime from within or without. 
The emergence of the guards’ “brigadiers’ government” during Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency eventually violated an existed equation in the Iranian political system. It left 
no shielding counterbalance to the IRGC, except that of the army, which had been wiped 
from politics by post-revolutionary purges, and “non-muscular” legalistic checking 
structures and procedures: the Supreme National Security Council, the Expediency 
Council, the judiciary, and the supreme leader’s power of veto. This shift is diminishing 
the role of the supreme leader as a ruler and arbiter, giving him steadily shrinking room 
for maneuver between the continually empowered guards and steadily marginalized “old 
elites” of the revolutionary generation. In practical terms, the last several years were a 
period of a “sneaking institutional coup.”118 It was conducted through legal means such 
as elections, institutional expansion, and other soft techniques, rather than by toppling 
civilian rule in a classical military coup d’état by display of a hard power. The new self-
styled elite that arose from the alumni would likely to move beyond protecting the system 
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to dominating it.119 There is a consensus emerging inside and outside the country that 
sees the conversion of Iran into a “military state” where “there is nobody left to guard the 
Guard.”120 
The political and geopolitical entourage associated with Iranian dynamics should 
not hide the primary cause that led to such a strategic shift. This cause is loopholes in 
civil–military relations in Iran that let regimes miss the point and gave the corps a way to 
gain momentum in transformation from the revolutionary into the praetorian (and 
counterrevolutionary) guard. The next chapter puts in analytical context the patterns of 
civil-military relations, its deviations, and some ways and means that enable the IRGC to 
overcome or negate civilian control and exert so high influence in politics, government, 
and society. 
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III. CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN IRAN: SPECIFICS AND 
PATHOLOGIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter traced the emergence and development of the IRGC as a 
political actor and placed the phenomenon in a strategic context. The current chapter 
elaborates and analyzes some of the causes that led to such an outcome. It will first 
provide a brief overview of the Iranian political system and relationships within this 
system, strategic culture and threat perceptions, and defense and security architecture. It 
will then address CMR issues, primarily its two major foci—national-security decision 
making (a.k.a. the decision-making process in the field of national security) and civilian 
control. More specifically, the chapter examines patterns of interaction between civilian 
leaders and top military commanders in elaborating and implementing strategic decisions 
related to the national security. Further, it reviews the mechanisms, techniques, and 
patterns of civilian control that are applied by the regime to manage the defense and 
security-forces pool. Particular emphasis is made on explaining the pathologies and 
loopholes in decision-making and civilian control, to better understand how an actor such 
as the IRGC is able to circumvent safeguards built into the system, and to exert influence 
and pressure on domestic and foreign policy. 
B. IRAN’S POWER SYSTEM AND NATIONAL-SECURITY MACHINERY, 
101 
Iran is unique in the contemporary world. Its political regime combines mixed 
features of formal democracy, theocracy, and dictatorship.121 The system of power is 
engineered on the basis of velayat-e-fakih (roughly translated from Farsi as “rule of 
jurisprudence”) that stems from a Shiite historical politico-religious tradition and not only 
denies separation between state and religion, but subordinates all aspects of the former to 
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the latter.122 The center of gravity of the entire system is the supreme leader (since 1989, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei). According to the constitution, he maintains top religious, 
political, and governmental power, including authority as supreme commander in chief of 
the armed forces. The chief executive is a president, elected by popular vote each four 
years. One of the primary functions of the parliament is to balance the president and his 
cabinet. Other checks and balances are embedded to control and constrain both the 
executive and the legislative branches (the Guardians Council, the Expediency Council, 
the Assembly of Experts, and the Supreme National Security Council). Since Iran is a 
highly legalistic state, the judiciary ministry also plays an important checking role. 
Mutually balancing each other, these entities form a complex construct that makes the 
Iran’s system of power unique.123  
Power and politics in Iran are best described as “kaleidoscopic factionalism.”124 
A crucial factor that influences the whole dynamic is the coexistence of formal 
institutions (both elective and appointed) with informal networks and inner circles.125 
Interaction within this constellation of actors is dynamic, fluid, obscure, competitive, and 
characterized by complex balances and shifting short-term alliances. The nature of the 
system de facto makes the supreme leader not a unilateral and omnipotent ruler, but 
rather a manager and mediator between different formal and informal centers of interest 
and influence. His power obviously has limits.126 Moreover, since the incumbent’s health 
is fading and his public posture diminishing, the supreme leader’s control is increasingly 
being replaced by shifting balances between groupings. At previous periods in the 
existence of the Islamic Republic, the political power system was based on and driven by 
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consensus, with the supreme leader acting as arbiter and last court of appeal for different 
interacting and conflicting elitist factions.127 However, at the current stage, the system is 
evolving into an even more authoritarian construct with the corps alumni’s exerting rising 
influence on the supreme leader.128 In this environment, the role of inner circles and 
informal networks is crucial in understanding the nature of the political dynamic and 
decision making. The formal institutions tend to act as a playing ground for the 
networks.129 
This reality is further aggravated by the ongoing generational shift in Iranian 
politics, where the old guard of the revolutionary era is gradually replaced by the new 
elite, mostly associated through the Pasdaran pedigree of the war generation.130 This 
cohort, associated with and represented by Ahmadinejad, has accumulated enormous 
economic power and is striving for political power.131 The change of generations 
exacerbates the existing elitist conflict, as indicated by the 2009 election upheavals.132 
The political elites engaged in this conflict are divided into four broad groupings. They 
might be defined, with certain conditionality, as the “conservatives,” (both traditionalists 
and pragmatists), the “reformists,” and the “principlists.”133 The latter grouping, 
composed mostly from the IRGC alumni, including Ahmadinejad, is subdivided into two 
groups, namely, radical and relatively moderate “principlists.” Ayatollah Khamenei, who 
has always been associated with the conservative trend, increasingly indicates his favor 
towards the “principlist” faction. 
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1. Strategic Culture and Threat Perceptions 
The key determinant of contemporary Iran’s strategic culture, after it was 
reshaped by the revolution, is a fusion of Iranian (Persian) nationalism and Shiite Islam. 
Its grand objectives might be defined as self-reliance, deterrence of perceived aggressors, 
and hunger for regional status.134 Iran has a firm vision of itself as a natural leader in the 
Gulf, the Middle East, and more broadly, the entire Muslim world.135 The Iranian 
strategic culture is underpinned by a set of past and modern grievances, a combination of 
assertiveness and caution, pragmatist and ideologist agendas, realist rationales, and 
emotional drivers. These components feed threat perceptions. 
The centerpiece of the threat perception is the United States. There is a basic 
consensus among the elites that the USA is an inherently hostile power responsible for 
past sufferings and current problems and oriented towards the overthrow of the 
regime.136 However, while more radical factions of the regime portray the Iranian–U.S. 
conflict as a geostrategic “battle,” the less radical view it as a geostrategic 
“competition.”137 That dualism stems from the networks-centered elites’ competition and 
reflects their different views of the world and Iran’s role in it, and of the ways and tools 
of diplomacy. 138 The revelation of such a gap helps to understand the nature of the 
existing mix of confrontation and rationalism in Iranian international behavior that 
represents a continuation of domestic politics. The national security strategy and foreign 
policy are highly influenced by the politico-religious-ideological discourse and 
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influence of security dilemmas, and the development of asymmetric response concepts, 
translated into practical doctrines that are not necessarily defensive, but rather, 
preemptive.139 
2. The Defense and Security Architecture 
After the revolution, Iran developed a diverse pool of forces and agencies that 
operate in the national-security domain that is as perplexed as the entire power system.140 
The major feature of the defense architecture is its dualism. While many countries, 
especially in the Third World, have parallel military structures that mutually enhance and 
counterbalance at the same time, only Iran has two full-fledged parallel services:141 the 
regular army and the IRGC, consisting of separate but similar branches. The Artesh, 
based on conscription, has nearly 400,000 personnel (350,000 in the ground forces, 
30,000 in the air force and 18,000 in the navy)142 and focuses exclusively on external 
defense. The Pasdaran’s strength is nearly 125,000, including some conscripts (100,000 
in the ground forces, 20,000 in the navy, and presumably 5,000 in the air). While 
focusing officially on internal-security functions, the IRGC, nonetheless also has external 
defense, foreign intelligence, and covert action capabilities, such as the Qods force (a 
special-operations component). Furthermore, it maintains ballistic-missile units 
integrated into the order of battle and supervises the national nuclear program, which is 
presumably weapons-oriented.143 Recently, the Pasdaran reinstalled its control over the 
Basij mobilization force ending its decade and a half of independent institutional 
existence. This act integrated an estimated one million paramilitary fighters (available on 
 
139 Ganji, “Main Currents in the Iranian Strategy since 9/11,” 2, and “Iran: Political Infighting and 
Foreign Policy,” Stratfor, August 4, 2009, 
http://stratfor.com/analysis/20090804_iran_political_ifighting_and_foreign_policy (accessed 08/08/2009). 
140 Thaler and others, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership 
Dynamics, 33-34. 
141 By fact, both the Artesh and the Pasdaran should be treated as agencies rather than services; 
however, for the sake of clarity they are defined as services.  
142 All strength numbers displayed in this paragraph are found in The Military Balance 2009, 
(London, UK: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009): 245–247.  
143 Jaafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis, 125-198. 
 40
                                                
partial mobilization)144 charged with the task of internal security, law enforcement, 
indoctrination, and wartime reserve deployment. The function of the regime security is 
duplicated by the law-enforcement forces (LEF), which number no less than 500,000 and 
include police, border guards, and various tribal levies, controlled mostly by the Ministry 
of the Interior (MOI). Another major actor from the set of the defense and security forces 
and agencies is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) with an estimated 
30,000 employees.145 The MOIS is in charge of regime stability and foreign-intelligence 
gathering. Finally, there are armed paramilitary vigilante groups, such as Ansar-e-
Hezbollah,146 that exist informally, outside the official structure, yet, were created by the 
regime (or some of its factions) to ensure security. 
C. NATIONAL-SECURITY DECISION MAKING 
Before turning to an analysis of specific patterns of the decision-making process 
in Iran, it is useful to start with some general observations. (i) The decision-making 
process in the field of national security is an essential component of civil–military 
relations in any state. It might be considered a “strategic” part of CMR. Ideally, national-
security decision-making represents a regular but carefully balanced process of input (in 
the form of strategy guidance and policy directives) provided by a political echelon or 
civilian leaders (or both), and output (in form of professional advice and expertise, as 
well as execution) from the national military command.147 (ii) Thus, the role of the 
military in political processes should not necessarily be understood in terms of direct 
intervention, such as coups, or military regimes. Rather, much more often it takes the 
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form of influence over policy and politics outside military’s formal role.148 (iii) 
Recognizing the military establishment as a legitimate participant in the decision-making 
process, it is impossible to eliminate the military influence on politics.149 In other words, 
politicization of a military that has expanded its outreach by participating in external 
defense is inevitable.150 Hence, the major task and responsibility of civilian leadership is 
to maintain military inputs and influences on the political aspects of the national-security 
decision-making, while ensuring they are controlled and positive. (iv) The key element of 
safe decision-making procedures is a diversity of inputs and contributions; all defense 
and security agencies must be engaged on the equal footing. (v) Any intentional or 
unintentional violation of balance in the course of interaction between the civilian and the 
military domains will likely precipitate eventual negative outcomes for national security. 
The most precarious potential outcome is a knowledge gap and information asymmetry in 
favor of the military. Such a state, described by E. Cohen as “unequal dialogue,”151 
provides the military room for maneuvering and behaving that is considered undesirable 
by civilian principals (or “shirking,” in terms of P. Feaver’s informal-agency theory).152 
1. Pathologies of the Iranian Decision Making 
The decision-making process in defense and security affairs of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (IRI) is only partially formalized and institutionalized. The major 
proceedings of the decision making are in fact self-contained in the informal web of 
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empowered personalities, networks, power centers, and the relationships between 
them.153 As in the entire system of power and the political field, the decision-making 
bears a similar hallmark: it is complex, convoluted, and opaque. As such, it is hard to 
predict for outsiders; most of its patterns might be established by indirect indicators only, 
such as activities of known formal institutions, official statements, or past events. Yet, it 
is intensive: tense and defined by a fragile balance of interests, permanent regroupings, 
and consensus building.  
A function of both formal and informal institutions and mechanisms is illustrated 
by the design of the top echelon of the IRI national-command authority. According to the 
constitution the entire pool of defense forces and security agencies are directly 
subordinated to the supreme leader as supreme commander in chief of the armed forces. 
The chief executive (the president) is in charge of its routine management and practical 
implementation of security policies.154 In that capacity he heads the Supreme National 
Security Council (SNSC), formally devised as the key national defense and security 
body.155 However, in fact, the council operates within the framework set up by 
Khamenei, without crossing his guidelines. The extent of the political role of the SNSC 
secretary, who acts as a representative of the supreme leader and is in charge of day-to-
day business, depends on his individual clout and personal credentials. For instance, in 
2005–2007 when the council was headed by Ali Larijani, an IRGC alumnus with far-
ranging political ambitions, it took a much more proactive position in foreign policy and 
decision-making. The current SNSC head, Said Jalili, has no such outreach and is placed 
under the influence of the Ahmadinejad-led alumni faction.156 Furthermore, though the 
council has permanent membership, the cast of participants in each meeting varies, 
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depending on the issue in focus.157 Not surprisingly, a body divided along political fault 
lines cannot be effective. Finally, the foreign ministry, the parliament and its committee 
on national security and foreign affairs play quite an unremarkable and often servile role 
in defense and security matters, respectively delivering only formal political expertise 
and oversight.158 
In addition, the set of formal institutions is enhanced by informal, less visible, yet 
influential, positions as personal advisors to the supreme leader, providing insider 
information and creating additional checks and balances capability vis-à-vis the military 
commanders, who maintain control over hard-power assets. Accordingly, Khamenei 
appointed Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, who commanded the corps from 1997 to 
2007, as his personal military advisor. That decision was allegedly taken on a calculation 
of the contradictions and frictions existing between Safavi and his successor, Major 
General Jaafari, as well as with President Ahmadinejad himself.159 Personal advisors 
provide another dimension in the Iranian model of decision making. 
There is another element of the Iranian national command authority that has, or at 
least should have, an important role in the decision-making: ministry of defense, joint 
staff, and headquarters’ of the uniformed services and branches. However, they are 
omitted from discussion here; their role is analyzed independently further below, in 
relation to patterns of civilian control and interservice rivalry. 
Thus the core pathology of the decision-making process in the defense and 
security fields in Iran appears to be very specific to this country. This pathology displays 
fragmentation, diffusion, informality, and self-containment in the inner circles’ “black 
box.” The supreme leader is a center of gravity of the decision-making, as always and 
elsewhere: “The current Iranian government, or any Iranian government for that matter, 
does not control institutions which are under direct control of the supreme leader, who 
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has his own policy-making machinery.”160 That probably implies that the subordinated 
actors in the decision-making field willingly accept the supremacy of Khamenei. As was 
indicated in the first half of 2000s, “it is generally assumed, that the leaders of the 
security sectors’ components comply with the civilian leaderships’ wishes due to their 
relative lack of military autonomy, although they champion their own agendas as much as 
they can.”161 Yet, since 2005, with the election of Ahmadinejad to a first term, the 
situation has been steadily evolving, with the alumni (who had already secured proximity 
to Khamenei and through it, greater autonomy) gradually installing a de facto control 
over the security institutions that were supposed to be equal participants in the decision-
making process. 
2. Decision-Making Input 
In general, the decision-making process, like the entire system of power, is 
formally centered on the personality of the supreme leader, who is supposed to provide 
major inputs, proceeding from the politico-ideological and religious norms and values 
established by the Islamic revolution. These inputs should be interpreted as broad 
strategic guidance. Often vague, that guidance might be delivered, for instance, during 
broadcasted Friday prayer sermons. Such kind of input leaves a wide field of 
interpretation by major actors in the decision-making process. As far as more concrete 
situations are concerned, the political views of Khamenei,162 which are consistently anti-
American and anti-Western, significantly influence the behavior of decision-making 
participants. The supreme leader might maneuver in certain cases, restraining the hawks 
and favoring moderate factions. However, the general direction was set up a long time 
ago, since Khamenei assumed the position that gives him so much power.163 
This creates a potentially precarious situation, in which the politico-ideological 
visions of the person in charge are resonant with the output of the equally ideological 
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security establishment, neither challenged by a parallel contribution of alternative 
institutional structures. In such conditions, aggravated by lack of professionalism, the 
incentives for the privileged side to shirk multiply progressively. In other words, “the 
existence of multiple centers of power combined with the existence of informal rules 
known only to insiders, which enable certain security institutions to exercise their 
influence, account for the opaqueness of decision-making process in this field.”164 
Furthermore, both civilian leaders and military commanders, operating in inner-
circle clusters and a politico-ideological grid system arising from a single school of 
thought, are risking a slide towards self-isolated dialogues on security that might generate 
a dangerous echo effect and eventually lead to equally dangerous decisions. 
3. Decision-Making Output 
All the above factors affecting the Iranian decision-making process are of crucial 
importance, since they can help in understanding and assessing a growing outreach of the 
IRGC. The features of the decision-making provide the corps’ alumni with room to 
maneuver for advantage, given the degree of influence they exert through their privileged 
relationship with Khamenei, their administrative resources, and the uncontrolled fortunes 
at their disposal. These advantages make them more assertive psychologically than any 
other actor. They are further multiplied by operational autonomy: 
The Guards’ level of influence in national decision-making is difficult to 
assess, but their intelligence activities would seem to give them an edge 
over civilian institutions and clerical interests on specific issues. It would 
appear that the IRGC’s autonomy in some areas, such as Lebanon and 
Iraq, is both unchallenged and integral part of Iran’s policies.165 
This autonomy, presumably granted by Khamenei (since no one else is in a 
position to do so), is transferred to the most strategically and ideologically sensitive 
domains of Iranian policy, such as the nuclear program and the Middle East. In fact, this 
autonomy translates into lack of transparency (under the natural excuse of secrecy) and 
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accountability. Eventually, this not only deforms the input–output equation, it creates a 
circuit, placing the IRGC in many cases as an input generator, instead of output producer. 
The mere fact of Brigadier General Hossein Kazemi-Qumi’s nomination (a high-ranking 
corps officer with a Qods background) as the ambassador to Baghdad—a man who 
allegedly was involved in coordination of the Iraqi Shiite insurgency—provides an 
example of mixing policy input and security output.166 In narrower terms, it illustrates a 
subduing of the ministry of foreign affairs as a legitimate actor in national-security 
affairs, by the IRGC, which presumably was selected as a lead agency on Iraq after the 
U.S. invasion because of its capabilities, and skillful manipulation by the supreme leader 
and his establishment’s threat perceptions.  
The guards’ activity in the decision-making process is both ideologically and 
rationally driven. In fact, both tracks often merge, as in the case of the Middle East policy 
in which anti-American and anti-Israeli idées-fixes are embedded into pragmatic desires 
and concerns, or vice versa. The “principlist” faction dominated by the IRGC alumni 
regards the active engagement of the corps in foreign policy matters as a logical 
extension of its constitutional role to defend the revolution from internal threats. At the 
same time, it perceives associated political opportunities in the domestic arena:  
The IRGC, whose leadership is dominated by principlists, has tended to 
favor Ahmadinejad’s approach to the Middle East, focusing on its own 
exemplary role in resistance and as a vanguard in exporting the revolution 
in the Islamic world through the success of its Qods Force in Lebanon and 
Iraq. The emphasis on security (as opposed to diplomacy) in Iran’s current 
approach to the Middle East works to the IRGC’s advantage and may give 
the Guards greater weight in policy debates. The IRGC would presumably 
benefit from this increased visibility by gaining more resources and 
increasing its prestige.167 
A glimpse of IRGC operational autonomy that trumps formally superior echelons 
in the chain of command and illustrates both a degree of assertiveness over and negation 
of peer security actors might be found in the so-called Karine-A incident of 2002, when a 
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merchant vessel loaded with a shipment of Iranian weapons for the Lebanese Hezbollah 
militant movement was intercepted by Israel. A subsequent investigation revealed that the 
operation was an independent initiative by the IRGC, undertaken without notification or 
knowledge of the SNSC, which supposedly must be informed.168 
Summarizing the decision-making process in defense and security-related issues, 
there is evidence that the IRGC, led both by the alumni and the active service 
commanders, assumes the alpha-male role in Iran’s decision-making. In a situation when 
input from civilian leadership often comes in the weak form of general religious-
ideological guidance and the top ruler demonstratively distinguishes a particular one from 
several institutionalized and legal actors in the national-security domain, the impact is 
almost inevitable. Since mid–2000s, IRI interaction with the outer world has been heavily 
influenced by the IRGC in its dual corporate–institutional capacity. The Byzantine 
environment, privileged access to Khamenei, and granted autonomy provide the guards 
with favorable conditions to outmaneuver and subdue or sideline its peers in the field. 
Products that should be delivered as military outputs (i.e., knowledge and expertise as a 
feedback to the civilian domain) come instead as twisted inputs, translated by IRGC’s 
effort into strategic guidance articulated by the supreme leader. Thus, the input–output 
curve transforms into a loop, contributing to further sharpening of information 
asymmetry and unequal dialogue between civilian leadership (i.e., Khamenei and his 
informal circle) and the top military establishment (represented by the IRGC, 
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D. CIVILIAN CONTROL 
There are different mechanisms, methods, and techniques, both direct and 
indirect, that are used by governments and politicians to exercise civilian control over the 
armed forces in order to achieve a dual goal: to maintain a sufficient tool for external 
defense, and, at the same time, to prevent the military establishment from intervening in 
the political sphere.169  
To prevent the armed forces from such intervention, civilians can professionalize 
the military and institutionalize control of it. The Iranian case is different. Despite the 
existence of formal institutions in the domains of the executive, legislative, and judiciary 
branches, and electoral processes and legal foundations, the entire political system is 
overmatched by the velayat-e-fakih. The informal structures and procedures, an absence 
of civil society and free media, and other distinctive nondemocratic features have a major 
impact on the patterns of civil-military relations in Iran. The regime facilitates other 
tracks of control, namely: (i) intentional politicization and indoctrination of the military; 
(ii) intentionally convoluted command and control (C2); (iii) command echelon 
appointments and promotions; (iv) material dependency; (v) interservice rivalry. The first 
four positions are analyzed in the current section, while the fifth, due to its importance, 
will be a subject of the focused case study in Chapter IV. The goal is to find out how 
effective are control measures in containing the political ambitions of any given actor in 
Iranian defense and security. 
1. Politicization and Indoctrination 
While civilian control, in theory, is devised to draw clear boundaries between 
military and political spheres, in practice these distinctions often blurred, since military 
personnel objectively become involved in politics as participants in national-security 
decision making.170 As indicated above, however, the IRGC has crossed most of the lines 
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that separate positive contributions to the decision-making from toxic influence. This 
situation is inherently linked to a core element that knowingly and deliberately laid into 
the foundation of the corps in 1979 for its politicization. Two decades after the 
revolution, it started to cause a blowback.  
Politicization is not a unique Iranian feature; it was used and is still used by many, 
if not most, nondemocratic regimes. This civilian control technique, described by S. 
Huntington as “subjective control,”171 essentially represents an intentional imposition of 
a politico-ideological “corset” on the military, especially its officer corps. By making the 
military a defender of the core ideological and political values that are allegedly “of the 
country,” the associated state regime hopes for protection from the threats arising from 
the internal environment.  
In Iran, political indoctrination links Shiite Islam, Iranian-Persian nationalism, the 
glory of the revolution, the fame of war with Iraq, notions of jihad, self-sacrifice, and 
martyrdom, and the shadow of enduring “enemy conspiracies.” It is an inalienable part of 
the internal political dynamic. Political propaganda and indoctrination are systematic and 
systemic processes, projected at the entire community of defense and security forces and 
agencies. As it is explicitly stated in the Article 144 of the constitution, “The Army of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran must be an Islamic Army, i.e., committed to Islamic ideology 
and the people, and must recruit into its service individuals who have faith in the 
objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to the cause of realizing its 
goals.”172 
Politicization is aimed at two major objectives: to ensure obedience to the 
principle of the velayat-e-fakih (i.e. subordination to the regime) and to facilitate the 
discipline and functioning of chain of command.173 These objectives are achieved 
through a web of structures and positions that surround the entire defense and security 
domain. One of the first foundations, created immediately after the beginning of the Iran–
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Iraq war to induce the Islamization and moral improvement of the armed forces, was the 
Ideological–Political Directorate (IPD), placed in the ministry of defense in October 
1980.174 The chief of the armed-forces joint staff (JS) has a deputy for cultural and 
defense publicity, which is manned by Brigadier General Seyyed Masoud Jazaeri (an 
IRGC alumnus).175 In addition, each service (i.e., the Artesh and the Pasdaran) and their 
subordinate branches and key headquarters, as well as the MOIS and the MOI, have 
special clerical representatives of the supreme leader. Representatives deliver political 
guidance and religious-ideological indoctrination as well as ensure supervision, loyalty 
checks, reports and inquiries. This partly institutionalized, partly informal oversight is a 
de facto replacement of the parliamentary one. The entire military hierarchy, down to 
each tactical-level unit, is penetrated by clerical appointees; some sources list an 
estimated 270 military chaplains in the IRI defense structure.176 An enforcement 
multiplier for the control system is the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces. 
Notably, the Pasdaran is not treated equally among other actors, being granted a 
special place and role in the process of politicization. It was initially devised as a political 
tool, according to the Article 150 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic that 
stipulates the IRGC “… is to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding 
of the revolution and its achievements.”177 The first three articles of the Statute of the 
IRGC (1982) expand this stipulation, stressing that the corps:  
… [holds the role to] realize the divine ideology and expand the rule of 
God through the legislation of the Islamic Republic of Iran...[to conduct] 
the legal fight against enemies or movements who aim at sabotaging or 
dismantlement of the Islamic Republic or act against the Islamic 
Revolution… [to conduct] the legal fight against elements waging an 
armed struggle to nullify the authority of the laws of the Islamic 
Republic.178 
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Thus, the political role of the corps was arranged initially by the emergent post-
revolutionary legal framework and was implemented and translated into practice on 
multiple occasions throughout of history of political conflicts in the IRI, whether by 
suppression of political opposition, oppression of ethnic minorities, or the emasculation 
and subsequent Islamization of the regular army at the immediate post-revolutionary 
stage. In the first half of the ‘80s, the guards played a major role in defeating 
underground opposition groups that posed major threats to the regime, contributing 
decisively to its consolidation and stabilization. Since the late ‘90s, with widening 
popular dissent, the IRGC has enhanced its security role, primarily through the Basij 
mobilization force, whose separate existence from the corps was only formal. This force, 
organized by territorial principle, is legitimized by Article 151 of the constitution, which 
obliges the government to provide military training “to everyone who wants to defend the 
revolution.”179 The Basij, recruited through the mosques mostly by rural and urban-
lower-class representatives,180 provides the IRGC with an extended social outreach and 
an effective coercive tool. It performs a broad range of political tasks of “counter-
sedition” and combating “soft revolution,” (i.e., regime change from within, an obsession 
of the ruling circle since the post-election unrest of 2009).181 In particular, the Basij 
execute crowd-control missions during public demonstrations, manage the university 
campuses, monitor citizens’ loyalty at the workplace and home, enforce the Islamic dress 
code, and, most important, are covertly placed in charge of ballot boxes.182 The political 
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“Basij efforts should not be limited to the military dimension... This force must be 
prepared to neutralize the soft threat and a range of plots by the enemy on the political, 
economic, cultural and social levels.’183 
In 2008–2009, the IRGC apparatus has strengthened its ideological activities by 
embedding political brainwashing into all popular paramilitary training and cultural-
education programs in its purview. It has also increased censorship of the media, 
including satellite TV, the Internet, and the blogosphere.184 The intention is to contain 
the perceived attempt toward soft revolution, or, as was stated in October 2009 by the 
newly appointed Basij commander, Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Naqdi, to 
control public opinion through “super media power.”185 The IRGC propaganda 
component encompasses a broad media network of newspapers, magazines, radio 
stations, TV companies, books, movies, and more recently, Internet websites and blogs 
that are directly linked to, or indirectly controlled by the alumni and the corps.186 They 
are engaged in routine propaganda proceedings as well as massive campaigns that 
develop along several major avenues: the fulfillment of the “line of the Imam” (i.e., 
Ayatollah Khomeini), the legacy of the sacred defense (i.e., the Iran–Iraq war), the cult of 
martyrdom and self-sacrifice, and a readiness to defend the country from inner and 
external enemies.187 The corps-controlled media apparatus is essentially transformed into 
a strategic communication tool, which the alumni use to target wider domestic and 
international audiences by sending messages in the form of statements, interviews, or 
articles. This pattern emerged in 1999 after publication of the “Letter of 24,” and since 
has been used as a mean of manipulating the perceptions and behavior of target groups, 
including foreigners. For instance, it is a routine for top and even mid-level corps 
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commanders to make statements on international issues, not always directly related to 
Iran, and it is normal to stress anti-U.S. connotations to keep up the anti-Americanism 
that is one of the major foundations of Khomeinism.188 Suffice it to note that other actors 
of the IRI defense and security pool, including the Artesh, though not completely 
restrained in making statements that are part of the official state ideology, still are less 
aggressive in this regard.  
In sum, it is important to understand that the politicization of the Pasdaran 
eventually caused a paradoxical adverse effect. The corps was transformed from a subject 
of politicization and indoctrination into a source. This “secondary explosion” effect 
became a mixed result of both its authority, granted by Khamenei, and its self-assumed 
role as ideology’s guardian and enforcer. There are many clear indicators that the IRGC 
is “pulling the blanket” on itself. An evidence of that is the statement of Major General 
Jaafari that the Pasdaran should “counter deviation from the ideology,”189 or the mere 
fact that the corps now trains its own clerics, while before they came from religious 
schools.190 These and many other eloquent examples resonate with the hypothesis of M. 
Janowitz, who suggests that the military (paramilitary) forces in developing countries 
might move from tasks of simply maintaining internal order to “political patronage,” 
enforcing national consensus on certain post-revolutionary stages.191 
“Follow-up indoctrination” of the entire society (i.e., ideological enforcement) by 
the guards stems from the politicization and Islamization of this paramilitary force by the 
regime in order to make it a coercive tool. Despite the fact that ideology was also equally 
projected at the army, the MOIS, and the MOI, the inherently political function laid at the 
very foundation of the corps made it possible to further privilege it vice the 
abovementioned actors. Such a situation objectively diminishes any role of the 
interservice rivalry as an effective way for civilian governments to build checks and 
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balances for the sake of a stable CMR. This consequence, presumably, was unintended, if 
the Iranian regime be viewed as a holistic entity. Though, seen from the perspective of 
political factionalism, there is also room to suggest that the supreme leader may have 
created such asymmetry intentionally, for his own ends—particularly to contain the 
influence of Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Khatami during their presidencies.192 Whatever the 
true reason, the history and outcomes of the politicizing of the corps represents a 
departure from the paradigm of Khameini’s predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
warned against excessive military involvement of the political process, and the behest of 
Mohsen Rezai, the longtime corps commander in chief, who called upon it not to 
intervene in politics.193     
2. Command and Control Structure, Order of Battle 
The need to balance the different services of the Iranian dual military led to an 
emergence of the rather peculiar command-and-control (C2) system. Significantly, it has 
developed not only as a result of an intentional desire of the founders of the Islamic 
Republic, who aimed at instigating a rivalry between the uniformed services in the spirit 
of divide et impera, but was also a result of the real frictions that emerged between the 
Artesh and the Pasdaran during the war with Iraq. Two overlapping trends have shaped 
the contemporary Iran’s C2 structure.  
All actors of the defense and security community are subordinate and report 
directly to Khamenei. The singularity of the chain of command is basically not too much 
differ from most other states, where the military is subordinated to the top executive, who 
acts as supreme commander in chief. What attract attention in the Iranian system, 
however, are two elements: the specific order of battle (ORBAT) and the multiple staff 
structures. Both uniformed services—the Artesh and the Pasdaran—have their own 
subservices (the ground forces, air force, and the navy). In addition, the corps maintains 
special-operations forces (a.k.a. the Qods force) and the recently regained mobilization-
force component (a.k.a. the Basij). Each service and subordinate branch is headed by its 
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own commander in chief and has an independent staff. Further, both the regular army and 
the corps have their own top joint staff. Finally, there is an umbrella structure of the joint 
staff of the armed forces (JS) that formally facilitates the joint operational control of both 
military arms.194 In sum, there are eleven staff elements in the military domain only, not 
to mention, for instance the law-enforcement forces, which also maintains its own staff. 
In addition, some units of the Basij are subordinate to local (provincial) governors rather 
than to their staff. And above all that, the JS and most other staffs are manned by 
delegated IRGC officers. 
Thus, military jointness is not Iran’s way, and its defense forces are not “purple.” 
Instead of manning unified, standardized joint forces, Iran affords the luxury of a 
complex ORBAT and C2 structure, associated with rigid division lines, duplication, and 
redundant bureaucracy and spending, not to mention challenges to war-fighting. Yet, 
through the lens of the civilian control, the interservice rivalry, and preservation of the 
regime’s internal stability and survival, such a way appears quite rational. The intentional 
complexity of the defense system and its top C2 echelon sacrifices effectiveness and 
efficiency to political control.   
Military dualism, based on the existence of a parallel, mutually balancing set of 
forces, is not a distinctively Iranian phenomenon. Such a pattern exists in many countries 
of the Third World, especially in the Middle East.195 Despite obvious tradeoffs between 
military (operational) considerations and the political (managerial) approach, the latter is 
prevailing due to the regimes’ survivalist logic. Dualism might affect combat but offers 
reasonable civilian control safeguards. 
The few attempts undertaken to overcome the Iranian military dichotomy were 
futile, primarily because of resistance from the guards.196 In 1988–1989, in the aftermath 
of war, President Rafsanjani tried to diminish the influence of the radical elements 
dominating the IRGC command and unify the C2 system by disbanding the IRGC 
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ministry and creating the JS. The corps lost its own institution, which was merged with 
the newly created Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). 
However, in 1997 Minister Abdullah Torkan, a politically neutral arms-industry specialist 
with close ties with Rafsanjani,197 was replaced by a guards officer, and since that period 
the MODAFL is headed and effectively controlled by IRGC alumni. To sweeten the pill 
even more, the supreme leader placed Mohsen Rafiq-Dust, the IRGC minster who lost his 
position due to reorganization, in charge of the Foundation of Oppressed and War 
Disabled, which rapidly became a major channel for the influx of money, officially 
designated for post-war reconstruction and veterans’ care, yet partially diverted to 
building the Pasdaran business empire.198 
As far as the MODAFL is concerned, its role, unlike in democratic or transit 
countries, is not focused on political and fiscal management of the military by civilian 
principals. Responsible for segments of the arms industry, acquisition, logistical support, 
international protocol relations, and training and education, it constitutes just another 
apparatus in the intentionally convoluted command-and-control system. Above all, since 
its creation it has been led by a uniformed person rather than a civilian bureaucrat or 
appointed politician. In charge of both the Artesh and the Pasdaran, since the late 90s it 
has been headed, as mentioned, by an IRGC officer.199  
3. Appointments and Promotions 
Scholars of CMR in the developed world, and in the Middle East in particular, 
identify political loyalty among the officer corps as a key element of military 
appointments and promotions policy. For instance, B. Rubin maintains that loyalty is 
often placed ahead of the professional qualification of candidates as an appointment 
criterion.200 This observation is made in the Iranian case as well. Yet, there is a certain 
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element in Iran’s cadre policy that, time and again, stems specifically from the peculiarity 
of the complex and fragmented system of power.  
Not surprisingly, strategic appointments and associated promotions are made by 
the supreme leader, who in his capacity as supreme commander in-chief has authority to 
appoint the commanders of both the Artesh and the Pasdaran, the head of the joint staff 
of the armed forces, and the commanders of the branches in their structures.201 
Furthermore, he personally appoints commanders of some key military formations 
subordinate either to the army or corps, such as of the capital garrison. As was envisaged 
since the revolution, this appointment authority provides an ultimate lever of influence on 
the hard-power component of the defense and security forces pool by placing the 
commanders, handpicked on the basis of loyalty, in charge of the “boots on the ground.” 
Appointment power gives the supreme leader an opportunity to maintain balance between 
key uniformed players. For instance, Major General Jaafari, who for a decade has been 
the commander of the IRGC ground forces and a leading Iranian theoretician in the field 
of asymmetric warfare, was appointed in 2007 as an IRGC commander in chief, based on 
his close personal relationship with Khamenei.202 However, his outgoing predecessor 
Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, who was in tense relations both with Jaafari and 
President Ahmadinejad, was simultaneously placed as a military advisor to the supreme 
leader.203 This move is a visible example of how the appointments instrument is used by 
Khamenei to check executive power and instigate intra-service rivalry among other 
military commanders, though they belong to the same ideological milieu. 
Some appointments, such as the members of the cabinet in charge of the 
MODAFL, MOIS, and MOI, are the responsibility of the elected president. Yet they 
should pass parliamentary approval process, which provides a playing ground for the 
different factions and eventually gives additional opportunities to the supreme leader and 
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the alumni, since the conservatives and the “principlists” have held a majority in the 
legislative body since 2004. The parliament wields some formal influence in 
nominations, since they are debated, and the candidates should present a four-year plan to 
their prospective ministries. However, the approved nominees should be eventually 
endorsed by Khamenei, and they act as part of the cabinet only technically, reporting 
directly to him.204 Such double procedure facilitates both a firm control over key security 
assets and a “virtual” democratic entourage of the ministerial nomination process.  
One more effective tool of the cadre policy track of civilian control is the rotation 
of top commanders and delegation of officers from one service to command positions in 
another. However, this tool, as in most cases, is applied selectively, privileging the IRGC. 
First of all, the tenure of command positions for the Artesh and the Pasdaran is different. 
From the three regular army commanders in chief since the creation of this position in 
1998, the first was in his post for two years—and two others, including the current one, 
for five years each. The IRGC enjoyed much more institutional stability: its first 
commander in chief served sixteen years (Mohsen Rezai, 1981–1997) and the second, ten 
years (Yahya-Rahim Safavi (1997–2007). Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the head of the 
MODAFL with guard grass roots, served that position nine years (1997–2005).205   
Another feature of the appointment policy by the supreme leader is seconding 
senior officers from one service to a command position in another service or security 
agency. In this pattern, for instance, in September 2005 IRGC brigadier generals Zolqadr 
and Afshar were moved from their positions as deputy commanders in chief of the corps 
to deputies of the ministry of the interior.206 Here the Pasdaran also enjoys the upper 
hand: since the late 90s, dozens of its officers were seconded to key posts in other forces 
or agencies, not to mention the MODAFL and the JS. At the same time, there is no 
information on any single opposite appointment to the IRGC. The only exclusion is the 
clerics, who are appointed by the supreme leader to fill some leading positions (especially 
in intelligence and the judiciary) in order to ensure control and indoctrination. However, 
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even in this regard the corps is able to “suck in” the delegated appointees. One example is 
Hossein Taeb, a senior cleric who led the Basij between 2007 and 2009 and later was 
appointed head of the IRGC intelligence bureau. After getting his theological education, 
Taeb joined the corps in 1982, served in the ranks during the Iran–Iraq war, and later 
served in different headquarters.207 Being enrooted in the system, he and similar former 
“aliens” probably belong and owe more to the corps than to the clergy. At any rate, such 
a de facto creeping institutional expansion and gradual takeover by the corps creates a 
shift of equilibrium and violates the very philosophy of the interservice rivalry process, 
where all participants should be treated equally, though not simultaneously and not in the 
same way. 
4. Materiel Dependency 
As B. Rubin maintains, material incentives and stimuli play an important role in 
projecting effective civilian control on the military forces in the Mid-Eastern region. 
They are split into two general categories: personal and collective. The former is usually 
understood as informal rewards to key military figures for their loyalty and performance; 
the latter is budgets, acquisition, and procurement preferences by civilian leadership to 
the military or paramilitary services, often based on their loyalty and performance rather 
than operational requirements.208  
In this regard, the Iranian case, as usual, falls into the informal political niche. As 
in many other countries, the parliament considers, debates, and finally approves the 
budget and its defense portion, and its official figures are published.209 Still, in reality the 
defense and security budget is highly obscure and dependent on the supreme leader’s 
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programs, and back channels,210 providing an effective additional lever vis-à-vis forces 
and agencies. Nonetheless, the IRGC is able to overcome or circumvent its materiel 
dependency in three ways. 
First, the developed lobbyist capabilities and access to the supreme leader and his 
office, as well as an influential faction in the parliament, help to facilitate favorable 
official budgeting, winning the battle for resources against other peers. Second, the corps 
controls a substantial chunk of the Iranian military–industrial complex that it established 
during the war with Iraq.211 Such control reduces dependency from foreign arms 
procurement and puts the corps in a privileged position in research, development, and 
acquisition in domestic military production. 
Third, and probably most important, material dependency is mitigated by huge 
financial assets, generated by corp alumni since the early 90s, when it was granted 
economic opportunities through bonyads (i.e., reconstruction funds linked to the opening 
foreign trade and emerging money channels). These structures were distributed on a 
patronage basis to corps commanders and veterans by the supreme leader, who sought to 
strengthen his initially unsure position by rewarding the loyalty of ideologically 
likeminded security actors. Notably, funds are placed out of any transparency, control, 
and oversight.212 Their existence enormously multiplied the alumni, not only by creating 
personal wealth and corporate assets, but also by forging informal socio-political 
alliances with the influential bazaari (merchant bourgeoisie) class.213  
Since the first election of Ahmadinejad, the Khatam Al-Anbia, the corps’ engineer 
branch, and its alumni-controlled subsidiaries and private companies, have been awarded 
over 750 government contracts in the oil and gas industry alone.214 They are involved in 
multiple and diverse economic and business projects, such as construction of the capital 
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subway system, seaports, railways, roads, bridges, and hydroelectric dams, and 
developing the automotive industry, medical clinics, and agriculture projects. They also 
highly involved in black-market activities, generating an estimated twelve billion USD 
annually, part of which is further invested abroad.215 
The described economic empowerment of the corps, stemming from the political 
rationales of the supreme leader, clearly indicates that the policy of buying loyalty with 
money has an obvious tradeoff: it significantly enables freedom to maneuver for the 
rewarded military elite. In broad perspective, it created a strategic implication: the corps 
emerged as a key stakeholder in the system with major incentives to preserve the status 
quo by any means. Uncontrolled enormous financial assets, a mafia-type economy, and 
cronyism of an oriental type objectively make the Pasdaran and its alumni a counter-
modernization and counter-reformist force to resist any opening of Iran towards the 
world, save through some controlled back channels.216 The “bureaucratic-authoritarian 
model” that emerged in some countries of Latin America in the 70s, consisting of a 
political alliance between the national military elites and technocrats to foster 
modernization, would hardly work in the Iranian case.217 At the same time, the guards’ 
“economic empire” creates its major soft point, being a trigger of popular dissent, area of 
inner competition, and visible target for international sanctions. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The civil-military relations in Iran in characterized by unique elements hardly to 
be found in other political settings, even in the same geopolitical region. They are 
affected by inherent deformations in both major domains, namely the national-security 
decision-making and civilian control, as follows. 
The whole system of power in Iran is a combination of formal (institutional) and 
informal (network-centric) tracks. As a result, despite the officially existing hierarchy, 
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neither the mutually balancing executive, legislative, and judiciary institutions, nor even a 
single totalitarian leader whose role becomes less controlling and growingly 
representative, are in full charge. Rather, the system is governed by informal shifting 
alliances of groupings, operating under the formal umbrella of velayat-e-fakih. This 
creates a vacuum in which a willing and able actor is in a position to take control. The 
developments of more than thirty years of Islamic Republican history, but first of all, the 
distorted civil–military relations, created the conditions that propelled the Pasdaran to 
such a position. 
Iranian civil–military relations, as with other segments, are also heavily 
contaminated by factionalism, the shadow of informal networks, and personal rivalries. 
Contained in a non-transparent, elitist sphere, they suffer from a lack of institutional 
dimension in the ministries, parliamentary committees, and national-security councils’ 
that should coordinate efforts and ensure civilian control, oversight, and transparency. 
Though formally existing, these institutions play a weak role in the CMR and lack any 
form of societal or media clout as well.  
One particular flaw in Iran’s CMR is a self-contained, supreme-leader-centered 
decision-making process in the field of national security, which leads to the growing 
exclusion of other legitimate participants, such as the regular army and intelligence, in 
favor of the IRGC. This, in turn, creates information asymmetry, doctrinal dominance, 
space for shirking, and excessive influence on the decision-making.   
 The civilian control track contains numerous loopholes as well. The applied 
methods and techniques, such as politicization through indoctrination, a complex C2 
architecture, material dependency, and leverage by appointments, did not prove effective 
vis-à-vis the corps. Moreover, the intentional politicizing and excessive rewarding caused 
a blowback. It converted the guards from a political force (as appropriate to a military 
establishment that engages in elaboration and execution of national-security policy) into a 
politicized force (i.e., the privileged stakeholder in the system). As it was noted, 
Perhaps the time has come for soldiers to become bureaucrats. So generals 
earn doctorates, take off their uniforms and run for president. From the 
point of view of some commanders, the new IRGC is returning to its 
previous three-sided form: to preserve the system, to revitalize and 
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promote Islamism as an ideology, and to defend Islam as a system against 
partisan politicians and professional intellectuals.218 
 The malfunctioning engines make the whole notion of civilian control in Iran 
hollow. One of the most important engines, interservice rivalry, was omitted in the above 
analysis. However, it is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
218 Ganji, “Civil-Military Relations, State Strategies and Presidential Elections in Iran,” 21. 
 64
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 65
                                                
IV. FAR UNEVEN RIVALRY: CORPS UP, ARMY DOWN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter on Iranian civil–military relations (CMR) did not address 
the issue of interservice rivalry; this is the focus of the current chapter.219 As elaborated 
in the introduction, some CMR theories hold that interservice rivalry is an important tool 
that civilian (political) leadership uses vis-à-vis the national military forces to meet three 
major objectives: to contain the latter within the professional domain; to create a system 
of checks and balances; and to maintain effective leverage of influence.220 Those 
objectives may be achieved as follows. 
Containment of the excessive energy and ambitions of the military establishment 
is achieved by diverting them from the political domain to the internal (professional) 
sphere, as well as by inciting or fueling competitive rivalry between the military services 
over their roles, missions, doctrines, and resource distribution (e.g., financing and arms 
acquisition and procurement). A system of cross checks is facilitated by assuring friction 
between the services to prevent excessive empowerment of any of them. The idea is to 
exploit their differences (be they bureaucratic, operational, technological, or cultural), 
and encourage mutual competition to control and build balance of power. A lever of 
influence over the military establishment is guaranteed by civilian principals acting as a 
neutral, impartial, and superior side, able to manage the military through existing 
institutional frameworks and channels. 
Obviously, the patterns of interservice rivalry technique in different settings will 
be diverse. They are determined by many factors, such as geopolitical location, geo-
cultural environment, historically shaped ways of war, the nature of the political system, 
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and technological factors. Despite its negative connotation, rivalry is not necessarily 
adverse. On the contrary, it may be quite an effective technique, or even a strategy, for 
imposing a checking restraint on the real or potential political ambitions of the military. 
Also, it may serve as a driver of innovation and efficiency in the defense system.221 Yet, 
on the other hand, interservice rivalry might affect the core function of the armed forces: 
its war-fighting effectiveness.222 These tradeoffs are a matter of calculation for a political 
authority choosing its preferences. The study of the Mid-Eastern region, for instance, 
indicates that local regimes, concerned with survival, often opt for policy-driven 
rationales over considerations of a purely military nature. In this way, they extend the 
notion of interservice rivalry, creating, in one form or another, parallel military forces 
(examples are Iraq under Hussein, Syria, and Saudi Arabia).223  
However, the Iranian case is distinct from the above and all other known cases of 
the modern military dualism, in which parallel forces are essentially just elite armed 
components, selectively recruited and rewarded on the basis of loyalty and placed under 
direct control of the ruler to counterbalance the bulk of the military. Conventional 
wisdom still portrays the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a counterweight 
to the Iran’s regular army. The fact, however, is that while interservice rivalry as a CMR 
technique applied by the civilians was true a time ago, it is not now. The study of the 
Pasdaran phenomenon offers, most of all, insights into the perversion of the fundamental 
philosophy of interservice rivalry.  
The key idea of this chapter is that interservice rivalry in Iran is so asymmetrical 
and one-sided that its purpose is essentially defeated. By making the rivalry track a mere 
formality the supreme leader and his group, who were permanently privileging the corps, 
have disabled the major checks and balances of civilian control. Intentionally or not, they 
made interservice rivalry in Iran’s military domain almost hollow: it only exists as such, 
but not as a policy tool of the civilian government. That leaves other factions in the 
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regime (and the whole country) to face the emerging outcome: the ascendancy of the 
guards to an almost unmatched degree of political power in the Iran of today. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the issue of 
services’ identities and institutional cultures as sources of difference and rivalry between 
them. The second section traces the origins and nature of rivalry between the IRGC and 
its competitors throughout different periods of time. To assess the specifics, this piece 
examines some empirical evidence of rivalry between Iran’s two military entities in the 
time between the Iran–Iraq war and 2009, as well as attempts of the regime to use this 
rivalry as leverage. The third section analyzes the rise and the prevalence of the corps in 
the specific fields of rivalry. Those fields are national-security strategy and foreign 
policy, information (intelligence), war-fighting doctrines and force structures, and 
defense budgets. And the last section addresses the societal aspects of the rivalry. It 
reviews the disparate social statuses and outreach of the corps and the army, which also 
have an impact on the issue in question. 
B. ASYMMETRIC IDENTITIES: SOLDIERS VS. WARRIORS 
Along with professional cultures and interests, a service identity, ethos, and pride 
are major internal distinctive features in most of the militaries of the world. The 
differences between them represent an important engine of rivalry. The field of service 
culture and identity is broad and multifaceted, ranging from the ways any given service 
performs its tasks and missions to its old traditions. “The military services have acquired 
personalities of their own that are shaped by their experiences and which, in turn, shape 
their behavior.”224 Once established, this culture is passed from one generation to the 
next. The Iranian case is no exception.  Moreover, the disparity between the institutional 
identities and cultures of the Pasdaran and the Artesh represents an obvious confirmation 
of it. This disparity also helps to understand why the rivalry between the IRGC and the 
Iranian army became so uneven and asymmetrical.  
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The army’s institutional identity was founded in the first half of the 20th century 
and further developed under the rule of the last shah.225 From the late 60s until the late 
70s, it was in the zenith of its might as a hierarchically organized, well financed, 
modernly equipped, loyal, and obedient military force with deep service traditions, pride, 
and high social status.226 The revolution turned all it upside down—the army was 
betrayed, demoralized, distrusted, and all but decapitated through bloody purges. Its 
social status was severely diminished by a monarchical stigma and its institutional 
identity was damaged by Islamization and the rapid promotion of junior officers to top 
command positions. However, it still was able to retain its spirit of nationalism, 
professional culture, and technical expertise, as was particularly demonstrated by its 
conduct in war.227 The army accepted the new regime in a shift of loyalty from the shah 
to the Islamic Republic. That implied subordination to civilian power, developed by 
professional military education, following the chain-of-command, and a policy of non-
interference into politics, as is common to regular military forces.228  
Conversely, Pasdaran’s identity and ethos were created and shaped by the 
revolution. From the beginning it was inherently an irregular force, since its core 
consisted of six relatively small urban guerrilla groups merged in 1979.229 Corps 
personnel were recruited through improvised vetting, mostly from young people aged 17–
28, from poor families and without military experience, save previous conscript 
service.230 At its early stage, the IRGC was guided or restrained not by manuals, rules, 
standard operating procedures, and a professional ethos, but rather by charismatic leaders, 
anti-establishment energy, religious zeal, and internal group dynamics.  
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The war of 1980–1988 led to professionalization and shaped an esprit de corps 
for the IRGC.231 Contrary to the expectation that a draft-based military force is 
“civilianized” by a huge influx of uniformed citizens, this never happened with the 
Pasdaran. Instead, it became militarized, and was able to further retain and enhance this 
status due to the nature of the regime, thepolitical system, an ever-complex security 
environment, cultural settings, and other factors. In fact, the IRGC underwent “reverse 
professionalization.” The war-generation Pasdaran members were largely students from 
civilian universities and schools, who often had to terminate their education. For instance, 
today’s two high-level corps alumni representatives, Major General H. Firouzabadi (head 
of the joint staff) and Major General M. Najar (head of ministry of defense, or 
MODAFL) are, respectively, a physician and a mechanical engineer by educational 
background.232 Such people— who had altered their life by participation in a revolution 
that overthrew a feared monarchy, survived the long and bloody war with Iraq, and 
participated in conflict in Lebanon and other overseas missions—by definition should 
have less piety towards a state or political regime. Their internal group dynamic was 
influenced by informality and revolutionary psychology, in stark distinction from the 
army’s hierarchy, manuals, codes, and structuralized and rigid procedures. Pasdaran 
personnel did not have the “self-imposed professional standards,” defined by M. Janowitz 
as a prerequisite of controlled organizational military behavior.233 Consequently, their 
vision and ethos is of warriors, rather than of the soldiers who constitute a regular 
military. 
At any rate, the war led the corps to attain two important factors: group cohesion 
and some degree of the technical expertise needed for an independent, military-type 
institutional identity.234 Soon after the war, the corps adopted a command hierarchy, 
permanent structures, military ranks, uniforms, a promotion system, and other 
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organizational features.235 By the mid-90s the IRGC appeared very much like a regular 
military force, formally integrated into the unified chain of command together with the 
Artesh. However, the process of change did not lead to an emergence of traditional 
military culture or alter the already existing identity and ethos of the guards. Neither did 
it lead to its containment in the initial, narrowly defined, internal security domain, though 
enhanced by an external defense mission by the war. The answer why it did not happen is 
found in a key feature of the IRGC:  the political role built into its mission at inception.  
This mission is explicitly expressed by Article 150 of the IRI constitution, 
defining the IRGC as a protector of the revolution and its achievements.236 The status of 
“guardians of the revolution,” granted by its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, remains a major 
force multiplier for the Pasdaran, contributing to the development of a sense of 
choosiness among corps members. The special mission of the corps is sustained despite 
generational change. Currently, cadets and junior officers, who are trained at Imam 
Hossein University, the guards’ high school, receive a professional military education, 
compatible in its quality with other third-world countries.237 However, the uninterrupted 
cycle of politico-ideological indoctrination that is embedded into guard training facilitates 
continuity of identity and transfer of the revolutionary spirit to a new generation.  
Certain approach in civil–military relations theory maintains that paramilitary 
forces at the post-revolution stage become, sooner or later, an indivisible entity serving 
the state—a sort of official bureaucracy.238 However, both the core political function and 
the entire influence of the Pasdaran trump this argument, at least partly. Iranian internal 
politics led to the fact, that after the late 80s, and especially since the late 90s, the corps 
was empowered by the supreme leader in exchange for loyalty. However, IRGC loyalty 
had a personal focus that replaced the former assumption of loyalty and subordination to 
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the civilian establishment that was formerly a non-negotiable tradition of the regular 
army. Revolutionary logic and the prevalence of the politico-ideological paradigm 
(implanted into the Pasdaran’s institutional psyche from outside and then self-developed 
through three decades), has inevitably led to intervention in politics. The IRGC 
increasingly thinks itself not just a servant of the existing system, but rather as a 
guarantor and a stakeholder. 
C. ORIGINS AND NATURE OF RIVALRY 
The rivalry between the Pasdaran and the Artesh had a bad start. The corps was 
directly involved in the post-revolutionary purges of the regular military, which came in 
two waves: in 1979–1981 against the perceived pro-shah elements and in 1982–1983 
against clandestine pro-communist cells in the army.239 In this process the Iranian officer 
corps by 1986 lost up to 17,000 officers, or forty-five percent of the entire 
establishment,240 due to executions, extrajudicial killings, imprisonment, forced 
retirement, and exile. The remaining elements were treated with suspicion and suffered 
from stigma for a long time.  
The obvious goals of the Khomeinists, who were the main drivers behind the 
campaign, were to punish, purify and Islamize an Artesh241 that, in the words of Mostafa 
Chamran (minister of defense from 1980–1981), was created by the shah to “defend 
Zionism and imperialism.”242 A combination of coercion and Islamization, coupled with 
fear of a “counterrevolutionary coup,” became a cornerstone of the civilian control 
philosophy of a new regime.243 That is not to say that the entire establishment was 
subjected to repression; rather, the command positions were filled by junior officers, 
especially those from religious families, or retired officers and generals with previous 
anti-shah credentials, such as Rear Admiral Ahmad Madani, who has been restored in 
service as the governor of the Khuzestan province and who tackled in this capacity an 
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insurgency of local Arabs; Madani later served as minister of defense and ran in the first 
presidential elections in Iran.244 This and other evidence indicate that the new regime did 
not exclude the army totally from the system. As far as the newborn Pasdaran was 
concerned, at that stage it primarily served as a counterweight to the army and a tool of 
internal security. This section addresses the origins, nature and evolution of rivalry 
between the corps and the army. 
1. Interservice Rivalry at War 
It is not clear to what extent the start of war with Iraq in 1980 diminished the 
threshold of continuous purges. But obviously, the task of territorial defense subdued, at 
least for the next eight years, the political aspects of rivalry between the old and new 
Iranian militaries. Yet another one emerged instead, concerning war strategy and conduct. 
The rivalry between the army and the IRGC over strategy was a continuation of 
the political conflict between different factions of the regime, in which the secular wing 
of President Bani-Sadr relied on the regular military, and the clerical wing, on the 
corps.245 Such a rift badly affected the conduct of operations. The reflection of it was a 
unilateral decision by the President, who desperately needed good news from the front to 
repair his image, committed the regular army, which sided with him politically, to an ill-
prepared offensive in January 1981. That offensive ended in fiasco and huge losses for 
the Iranians.246  
After President Bani-Sadr lost his political conflict with clerics and left the 
country in summer 1981, the Iranian war strategy started to change. As was noted, “…in 
1981, Iran’s military school and training system completely collapsed. Since faith and 
human-wave infantry were all that would be required, the clerical government replaced 
the existing system with ideological and pure infantry training.”247 This pattern of 
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warfare was advocated by an IRGC that lacked military professionalism, but not religious 
fervor and zeal. Notwithstanding, the even poorer performance of the Iraqi side made it 
possible for Iran not only to contain the enemy, but to push it out from the occupied 
clusters of Iranian territory. By summer 1982, Iranian troops had restored control over the 
border with Iraq. However, the clerical regime that had defeated its secular opponents 
was still concerned with the consolidation of its unstable domestic positions; challenged 
by the opposition urban guerrillas, they turned down an Iraqi offer of cease-fire, declaring 
a “war until victory over the aggressor.” At that stage, the role of the guards over the 
army command in determining war strategy and the conduct of military operations rose 
significantly, further exacerbating the already present tensions between the two 
services.248 
The years 1982–1985 saw a chain of unsuccessful attempts to break through Iraqi 
defenses and transfer the war into enemy territory. The cost of these futile efforts for the 
Iranian side was dozens thousands of deaths. One major reason for such an outcome, 
beyond a flawed overall strategy and adverse international environment, was the constant 
operational and political friction between the Artesh and the Pasdaran, and their 
competition for resources, which were scarce due to an arms embargo. Finally, in 
February 1986, the Iranians were able to achieve their first major success, capturing part 
of the Iraqi territory at the Fao Peninsula. This success, attributed to the unconventional 
tactics employed by the guards—at least in its own interpretation—led to far-reaching 
strategic outcomes. The political leadership became more convinced of the feasibility of 
its desire to totally defeat Iraq and install an Islamic regime, and thus declared the next 
year a “year of victory.”249 The guard commanders, gaining clout, were behind the 
decision to turn to a “total war” strategy. The objections of the top army commanders 
against substituting tactical planning with ideology and fanaticism were not taken into 
account, generating a serious crisis in the command echelon. This crisis culminated in the 
relief of duty of Colonel A.-S. Shirazi, the army’s commander; however, his replacement 
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by Colonel H. Hassani-Saadi, a Khomeini loyalist, did not remove tensions.250 The 
guards took the upper hand, and were granted the authority to get all human and material 
resources needed for implementation of the new strategy of choice, whose essence was 
coined by the guard commander Mohsen Rezai: 
So far in the imposed war only two percent of the country’s popular forces 
and 12 percent of its economic forces have been utilized… It is sufficient 
for us to bring into the battlefield four times more infantry forces with 
light weapons than the Iraqis [to win]… We are on the threshold of a full-
scale people’s war, and this is the only path.251  
 The “year of victory” turned into a disaster in 1987, when the Iranian losses 
sustained in the chain of human-wave assaults that were the guards’ trademark mounted 
to its highest point.252 The official statistics of the loss structure reveals that of 188,015 
Iranians killed during the war, the combined IRGC and the Basij forces lost sixty-four 
percent, while the army and LEF only twenty-three and two-point-eight percent 
respectively (the rest were presumably civilians).253 This failure was further aggravated 
by the opening of a second front in the Gulf, which emerged due to Iranian attacks 
against international shipping, unilaterally increased by the guards despite objections 
from the regular military. Maritime guerrilla warfare, waged since early 1987 by a newly 
created naval branch of the corps (IRGN), brought Iran to the verge of a large military 
confrontation with the U.S.254 In April 1988, one of the incidents, in which a USN 
warship was damaged by a sea mine planted by the guards, led to a U.S. retaliatory attack 
(operation Praying Mantis) against the assets of the regular Iranian navy (IRIN), some of 
which were destroyed or damaged.255 This episode brought conflict between the 
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ideologically driven guard command and the regular military, who understood the danger 
of war confrontation with the States, to the extent that the IRIN reportedly swept the sea 
mines planted by the IRGN.256  
The growing influence of the corps on strategy and negative outcomes it reaped 
generated criticism of human-wave tactics from the more pragmatic factions of the 
regime (headed by the parliamentary speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who was placed as the 
supreme commander in chief of the armed forces in 1988). The pragmatists feared the 
rise of popular discontent with the protracted war and human losses and tried to check the 
belligerent posture of the guards and break a war deadlock.257 Eventually, they were able 
to persuade Ayatollah Khomeini to accept a cease-fire. 
The war clearly indicated deep disagreement and mutual mistrust between Iran’s 
two militaries over strategy and tactics, linked to politico-ideological rifts in the elites. It 
further aggravated the already existing cleavages produced by the purges of the army’s 
officer corps. In addition to fighting the common enemy, both the Pasdaran and the 
Artesh were engaged in mutual interservice conflict. It demonstrates that at least two 
decades ago the rivalry was real. Moreover, the regime used it both as leverage and 
instrument of mutual balancing between two forces. 
2. Missed Opportunity One: Post-War Damage Control 
Armies returning home from war, especially when unsuccessful, historically 
represented a threat to regimes. In the case of Iran, such a threat was posed not by the 
regular military, cleared from the pro-monarchy stigma by its fight, but rather by a corps 
that had gained battlefield experience, political influence through participation in 
strategic decision making, and ideological radicalization.258 The end of the war was 
followed soon by the death of Khomeini, creating a de facto dualism in the power system, 
where Ayatollah Khamenei, nominated as new supreme leader but weakly empowered 
and lacking his predecessor’s credentials, was confronted by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who 
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was elected as president in 1989. The latter, aware of the potential danger presented by 
the guards, has clearly shown his favor towards the army. But even before, in October 
1988, at a meeting of top military commanders, he stressed the need for 
professionalization of the Pasdaran and better coordination with the army: “The IRGC 
now is not as it was in the early days… if we are to rely on the IRGC as an armed force, 
if the regime is to serve God, the IRGC must not think that when it is attacked it can fight 
with Molotov cocktails.”259 From his side, the corps’ commander, Rezai, in an unusual 
move, had to publicly admit mistakes in the corps’ conduct of war, a humiliation in 
Iranian culture. 
Overall, the first half of the 90s was the only period in recent Iranian history when 
the regular military was almost on an equal footing with the guards. The disbandment of 
the IRGC ministry and detachment of the Basij force from the guards, mentioned earlier, 
were correlated with attempts to enforce operational jointness, vigorously lobbied for by 
an army that took into account lessons from the war.260    
Indicators of Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s favor towards the army are seen in the 
weapons-procurement programs of that period. The acute need for rearmament and 
modernization in an environment of scarce resources, resulting from the international 
isolation of Iran, generated a competition between the army and the corps over “toys,” 
and made the weapons program a carrot at the disposal of the government.261 The major 
arms-supply contracts of the late 80s–mid-90s between Iran and the USSR/Russia, such 
as Kilo-class submarines, SA-5 surface-to-air missiles, SU-24 and MIG-29 jet fighters, T-
72 main battle tanks, and BMP-2 infantry-fighting vehicles,262 were diverted in the 
army’s favor, while the IRGC was limited to Iraqi war trophies and low-tech weapons 
supplied by China and North Korea. This procurement pattern illustrates how the 
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government used its opportunities in applying leverage of rivalry in order to keep both 
forces under control by dividing them on the materiel ground. 
Yet, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, while able to limit the immediate post-war challenge 
posed by the corps through more favor towards the army and its attempts to introduce 
jointness, did not, in his two consecutive terms as president, eliminate the rising political 
ambitions of the corps elite, who forged privileged relations with the supreme leader—
who in turn sought support in his rows with the influential president. This first real 
opportunity to put a restraint on the guards was not used. 
3. Missed Opportunity Two: Purge of the Intelligence Ministry 
The second missed opportunity was during the tenure of the reformist president 
M. Khatami (1997–2005), who was able through indirect pressure to displace 
Mohammed Rezai, who led the corps for sixteen years.263 The latter had to obey, and 
moreover, called on the subordinated personnel to respect the decision of the political 
leadership and not intervene in politics.264 Yet, the powers-that-be allowed the supreme 
leader overcome this move by appointing Rezai’s protégée, Major General Safavi, as 
corps commander.  
However, Khatami’s main effort was distracted by a conflict with the ministry of 
intelligence and security (MOIS). The MOIS, institutionalized later than the IRGC, in 
August 1984, initially challenged the corps in the field of national intelligence 
estimate.265 The latter was forced to cede part of its intelligence-gathering activities to a 
new ministry.266 By a national law, the MOIS, which was controlled by appointed clergy 
from trusted theological schools, received responsibility to coordinate and direct all 
intelligence activities conducted by the IRGC’s bureau of security and intelligence, as 
well as military intelligence (the J2 department by the joint staff) and the intelligence and 
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security branches of the Basij—the LEF/MOI and the general prosecutor’s office267 
being formally not accountable to anyone, except the supreme leader.  
Both the MOIS and the IRGC were also engaged in a covert campaign of 
neutralizing the Iranian opposition in exile, which program by the mid-90s was 
transferred into the country itself. The campaign, claiming the lives of over eighty 
dissidents, came to light in 1997 and resulted in a protracted crisis, which eventually gave 
Khatami an opportunity to replace the top hardliner elements in the MOIS staff with more 
moderate men.268 By the time the issue was resolved in 2000, the corps had already 
stepped into the intelligence and security vacuum that emerged with the MOIS 
disarray.269 Moreover, the guards clearly used the moment to declare its political 
ambitions in the Letter 24 manifesto. Thus, while busy engaged in the apparatus struggle, 
the reformist wing of the Iran’s leadership missed both the emerging center of gravity and 
the long-term strategic perspective, unwillingly reducing an important checking power of 
the MOIS vis-à-vis the corps. 
Khatami’s government paid little attention to the army, missing an opportunity to 
create an alternative checks-and-balances mechanism by empowering the Artesh vice the 
Pasdaran. Analysis of the events of that period illustrates that the political leadership 
embraced the army, which continued to keep a low profile, only in periods of 
international crisis. In October 1998, after the slaughter of the Iranian diplomats by the 
Taliban militia in Heart, when Iran was on the verge of a military invasion of 
Afghanistan, the government endorsed the creation of a commander in chief of the army, 
to equalize it with the IRGC (which had maintained its own commander in chief since 
1981).270 In a similar pattern, a rare public statement in summer 2002, when it became 
clear that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was imminent, the army’s commander in chief, Major 
General Mohammad Salimi, provided assurances that his forces were monitoring and 
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preparing to counter any American threat.271 The neglect of the army by Khatami looks 
even less logical, because he was viewed as a nationalist, and as such would likely gain 
support from the Artesh, which, despite Islamization, still remained a more secular force 
with an enrooted nationalist tradition.272 Whatever the reason, the reformist President not 
only missed an opportunity to restore the equilibrium of interservice rivalry and convert it 
into an advantage for the civilian government. But he even caused an unintended 
backlash, unwillingly contributing to the empowerment of the corps. 
4. Rivalry Redux 
Since the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005, with the corps ascending and the army 
continuing to keep a low profile, any visible indicators of interservice rivalry disappeared 
from the surface for a long time. Not the rivalry itself, though. In an unusual 
development, in early 2009 the army command voiced its criticism of the corps. On 
February 8, 2009, Major General Ataollah Salehi, the army commander in chief, 
published an article to express the corporate dissatisfaction with the fact that the IRGC 
command through the controlled media portrayed the corps as the only force that fought 
in the war with Iraq, at the same time diminishing the army’s role.273 The article was 
signed by top military commanders; sending a shockwave prior to June elections. 
Although at the period of elections and associated instability the army kept silence, the 
dispute resumed after Major General Jaafari, the corps’ commander in chief, gave a TV 
interview in which, again, the army’s credit was diminished. This move triggered a set of 
counter-interviews and articles by the top army generals, who beyond being snubbed, 
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the reelection of Ahmadinejad.274 Major General Hassan Saadi, the deputy commander 
of the army, described the IRGC claims for sole credentials as the “height of unfairness,” 
adding: 
We must ask: who went to the war front in the first days, and offered the 
first martyrs? At that time the IRGC did not yet have a single platoon; in 
fact, it had not yet been properly formed. It was the land forces of the 
regular army that stood against the aggression of the Baathist regime…275 
This statement was supported by Brigadier General Hassan Shah-Safi, the 
commander of the regular air force, who stressed the role of the service as being defense 
against external threats, implicitly referring to the internal, oppressive function of the 
corps. In an even more overt statement in September 2009, Brigadier General Gholam-
Ali Rashid, deputy chief of staff of the army, complained about uneven budgeting and 
payment, stressing that disparity between the two services and application of double 
standards undermined morale.276 
While there is no clear indication that these developments were directly linked to 
the political crisis of 2009 and consequent second stage of the guards’ institutional 
expansion, the media exchange between the army and the corps represents striking 
evidence that the Iranian army still remains a potential player, though still a tacit one. 
However, the role of the regime behind this episode is unclear. There is a probability that 
some factions within the regime are reconsidering the army’s role in containing too much 
empowered corps. 
D. RISE OF THE CORPS IN THE FIELDS OF RIVALRY 
The rivalry between the IRGC and the army pierces the interrelated fields of 
national security strategy, defense policy, operational doctrines, force structures, 
responsibilities, and budget allocation. It is reflected in the emerging corps’ intelligence 
monopoly and resultant information asymmetry, though in this field it competes with the 
 




                                                
MOIS rather than with the regular military. There is also the field of foreign policy, 
where the IRGC is not supposed to operate at all; however, not only does it penetrate 
there, but it often sidelines legitimate players, such as the ministry of foreign affairs or 
the supreme national-security council. This section explains patterns of the rise of the 
corps’ influence in the abovementioned fields due to absence of sufficient rivalry and 
equally powerful competitors.   
1. National Security Strategy and Foreign Policy 
Theoretically, the military establishment participates in the development of 
national-security strategy in a form of expertise (professional advise) provided to civilian 
leadership within the generic framework set up by the latter. When the strategy translates 
into practical policy, the military participates in its implementation together with other 
competent government agencies, under the clear guidance and directive control of the 
supreme civilian echelon.277 Notwithstanding autonomy and compartmentalization, 
inevitable in such activity, the military still remains accountable for its actions. The 
involvement of different services and branches of the military, as well as of other 
government agencies that formulate and implement national-security strategy and policy, 
is an effective policy tool at the disposal of civilian leaders to control and, if necessary, 
correct the process and its actors. The competitive mode is a key to a successful course of 
action, while the unavoidable friction between the actors, generated by such competition, 
should be treated as mere collateral damage. In Iran, this paradigm is distorted by the 
centrality of the IRGC in the national-security domain. 
The root causes of the abnormal influence that the corps exerts on Iranian 
security, defense, and foreign policy can be traced back in the credo of its founder, 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who envisaged the “exportation of the Islamic Revolution” beyond 
Iran’s borders. Consequently, Article 154 of the constitution defined, though vaguely, the 
corps as a force aimed at the “happiness of mankind” and “protection of human rights” 
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[sic!].278 This is just a reflection of the conceptual visions that in three decades 
transformed what at a first glance appeared as an ordinary paramilitary group created for 
internal order into an influential, regional-security spoiler with a worldwide reach.279 
Since the early period of the Islamic Republic, the IRGC has been involved in 
missions abroad, for example in Lebanon (from the mid-80s), Sudan (in the early 90s) 
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (mid-90s),280 gradually developing a professional culture 
and evolving from a revolutionary, “romantic” volunteer force towards a classical covert 
intelligence and subversion organization, what did not diminish its radicalism.281 Suffice 
it to note in this regard that the regular military was never deployed for external missions, 
with the rare exception of the few naval assets sent to Somalia in 2009 to combat 
piracy.282  
The growing involvement of the IRGC in foreign affairs that reflected the 
domestic conflicts within the Iranian elite caused a serious blowback. In 1986 Mehdi 
Hashemi, a senior guards officer who led the Office of Liberation Movements, publicly 
revealed information on the clandestine contacts between Iran and the U.S., triggering a 
political crisis known as the “Iran–Contra affair.”283 This episode illustrated the ability of 
radical elements from the corps, driven by ideology interpretations, not only to 
circumvent the SNSC and the foreign ministry, who are supposed to be leading agencies 
in foreign-policy matters, but also to act contrary to the will of political leadership (or, at 
least, some of its factions). Another display of a dangerous combination of new 
operational autonomy and radical indoctrination took place in 1991, when the extremist 
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elements from the corps’ naval branch reportedly tried to fire an anti-ship missile at U.S. 
forces participating in the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.284 
After first election of M. Ahmadinejad, the involvement of the corps as a whole, 
or as alumni, into the elaboration and implementation of policy, grew exponentially. This 
might be proved by the flurry of statements and comments that IRGC senior commanders 
issued on different aspects of political and security developments in the Gulf, the Middle 
East, and even elsewhere in the world, at a time when officials from other agencies 
preferred to restrain themselves or use more diplomatic discourse. For example, in 2007 
the newspaper Keyhan, the corps-controlled mouthpiece, incited a diplomatic controversy 
by claimed Bahrain as a territory that “historically belonged” to Iran.285 In another 
instance, in summer 2009 Major General Firuzabadi, a chief of the joint staff but a guard 
alumnus, meddled into the internal affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, threatening 
“consequences” due the visit of the Israeli president to that country.286 However 
irrational and ideologically driven this kind of statement appears, in reality they are based 
on political calculations, such as the threat to strike Israeli nuclear facilities issued on 
July 2009 by the IRGC commander Jaafari, in an apparent attempt to divert public 
attention from the electoral crisis to external irritators.287 By the same reason, despite its 
politico-ideological background, the IRGC never criticized China and Russia, both Iran’s 
partners, for atrocities against Uighur and Chechen Muslims.288  
Yet, the real challenge has been the practical implementation of the corps’ version 
of a security policy, performed by the IRGC itself, as might be illustrated in the case of 
Iraq. Iran started to penetrate the Iraqi political playground even prior to the U.S. 
invasion in 2003 and has emerged as a key spoiler through its multifaceted support of the 
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Shiite insurgency as early as in 2006. The IRGC, or more precisely its Qods force 
(IRGQF), emerged as a lead agency in Iraq,289 responsible not only for strategy and 
policy implementation, but, even more importantly, for its generation, subduing in this 
business all other possible players, from the MOIS to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), which in particular was clearly illustrated by the background of the Iranian 
ambassador to Baghdad. That said, it should not mean that such an important issue as 
Iraq was left completely to the will of the guard command. Rather, in this case the 
supreme leader applied an intra-service rivalry technique instead of an interservice, by 
his clear preferentialism towards the Qods force. Technically an organic part of the 
IRGC, the IRGQF, nonetheless, reports directly to and is accountable only to Khamenei, 
bypassing the formal chain of command.290 Moreover, the IRGQF commander, Brigadier 
General Qassem Solaimani, reportedly has close personal relations with the supreme 
leader.291 Those two factors provide insight into the specifics of civilian control, as 
understood and executed by Iranian leadership.     
Beyond Iraq, another major line of IRGC autonomous external role is related to 
the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). In June 2004, amid debates 
between moderate and radical elements in the IRI government over the emerging nuclear 
row with the West (in which the radicals eventually took the upper hand),292 an IRGC 
unit seized eight Royal Navy personnel in Iraq.293 In March 2007, the period of active 
international negotiations on the nuclear issue, the IRGC, in a repeating pattern, seized 
fifteen Britons in the Gulf. Study of this incident suggests that while no decision-making 
headquarters is presumed to have been involved, the corps’ operational culture, based on 
decentralization and political indoctrination (i.e., awareness of the general political 
directive) allowed a local commander—who was later awarded for his conduct—to make 
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a decision.294 In September 2009, the corps conducted demonstrative missile firing tests 
(the Great Prophet IV exercise) just days ahead of negotiations with the West on the 
nuclear issue in Vienna.295 
All these and many other examples, such as the Karine-A affair referred to in 
Chapter III, provide grounds to suggest that the IRGC is hardly checked by any other 
government agency in its influence on national security and foreign policy. Though the 
SNSC, the MFA, and the MOIS are also involved in the process, the corps, utilizing its 
informal channels to the supreme leader, is not matched, checked, or counterbalanced. As 
for the army, it is virtually excluded from the process. Thus, ISR in the field of Iran’s 
grand strategy growingly resembles a one-man show. Operating in the niche, being 
hardly controlled or accountable, driven by a radical ideological indoctrination, and 
handling all regional proxy forces, the IRGC has transformed itself into a key player in 
national security and foreign policy,296 contributing to the increasingly militarized 
international behavior of Iran.  
2. Information Domain 
Information asymmetry between the defense establishments and their civilian 
superiors (i.e., dissimilar knowledge in the professional field) is a natural factor of 
interaction between the military and civilian domains in the process of elaboration and 
implementation of the national-security strategy. This particularly happens due to the 
closed nature of the military system and organizational bias.297 This knowledge gap 
results from what was characterized by Elliot Cohen as an “unequal dialogue” that, 
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however, eventually proceeds in favor of the political echelon, whose superiority is 
guaranteed by the checks created by the existing legal system.298 This asymmetry is 
usually corrected and mitigated through the diversification of the sources of information 
used for the mentioned ends, while the instigated competition between different national 
intelligence agencies adds to the quality of their product. This practice was also applied 
in the Iranian setting, where the pool of intelligence services was coordinated by the 
MOIS. However, this situation has been changed under pressure from the IRGC. 
Since the reelection of Ahmadinejad for a second term, Ayatollah Khamenei has 
sanctioned the centralization of at least part of the intelligence apparatus, transferring it 
under the auspices of the corps. It encompasses the IRGC’s intelligence bureau, the 
newly created IRGC cyber-defense unit, certain units of the internal-security directorate 
of MOIS, the intelligence cell of the supreme leader’s office, and several other covert 
intelligence and surveillance units.299 Though it appears that reorganization is aimed at 
increasing the domestic-intelligence role of the corps (given the emergence of Internet-
monitoring capabilities in its structures and the regime’s efforts to link the opposition to 
“foreign forces”) one should expect that the IRGC will increase pressure on the MOIS to 
yield even more authority. The intelligence arm of the IRGC already places its operatives 
under diplomatic cover in IRI embassies abroad.300 Moreover, the ministry itself has 
been headed since August 2009 by Heydar Moslehi, a corps alumnus.  
The not-so-unlikely loss of the MOIS coordinating role in the field of foreign 
intelligence and the subduing of it as a competitor would remove one more check and 
indicate the corps’ supremacy in the field of gathering and interpreting information for 
feeding the NSDM cycle at the top level. This is especially important in the light of the 
low and obscure profile of army intelligence (J2), which has liaisons both to the guards 
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and the MOIS and participated in foiling some “counterrevolutionary plots” in the 80s.301 
These factors might indicate that intelligence is already controlled by the security 
apparatus rather by the military. Given the specific origins of other components of the 
regime (the clergy and technocrats), it is safe to expect increasing manipulation of threat 
perception on behalf of the alumni, who would be even less restrained in their 
maneuverability in capitalizing on political influence. A national-intelligence estimate 
will remain contained in the closed and classified chamber of a sole structure, affected by 
organizational bias and ideological inclinations. This will lead to even greater autonomy 
for the upper echelon of the guards, which will allow it to shirk in its own way. The least 
expected outcome, again, would be an increasing “securitization” of the Iranian foreign 
policy. 
3. War-Fighting Doctrines and Force Structure 
Military (war-fighting) doctrines are an inherent field of rivalry and friction 
between the uniformed services, since they operate in different ways, with different 
means and through different cultures.302 In the case of Iran, the issue is aggravated not 
only by two parallel sets of ground, air, and naval forces coexisting in the same domains, 
but also by their disparate political status, created at the immediate post-revolutionary 
stage with the foundation of the corps and purges of the army.  
The doctrinal rift between two services emerged as early as late 1979, soon after 
the revolution, when a group of senior army officers, based on their assessment of the 
poor performance of the newly created corps in combating the Kurdish insurgency, 
advanced an improvement plan to the ministry of defense. The proposal suggested the 
creation of a unified command (i.e., joint staff) to coordinate operations, the 
mechanization of corps units, and the use of army instructors to train Pasdaran 
personnel.303 However, the offer was torpedoed by the corps. In the following eight years 
of war with Iraq, it was army professionals who continuously insisted on jointness and 
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corps self-styled commanders who constantly sabotaged the effort. Such a behavior 
reflects the nature of rivalry at its early stage, where the IRGC was eager not only to 
maintain the gained autonomy, but to achieve supremacy over the regular military 
Post-conflict Iranian military doctrine was heavily influenced by the painful 
experience of war, as well as clashes between the IRI and U.S. forces in the Gulf in 
1987–88,304 and was codified in the 1992 regulations of the armed forces. Influenced by 
the regular military command and regaining ground under president Hashemi-Rafsanjani, 
the document, despite many politico-ideological connotations and modalities, appears 
professional, systematic and, above all, aware of the need for some civilian oversight.305 
An example of the army’s temporary doctrinal influence might be found in an article by 
an anonymous author in the official Saff military magazine (Spring 2001) that stresses the 
professional and technical side of warfare (e.g., firepower and mobility) while largely 
missing the traditional ideological entourage.306 For more than a decade, the army 
insisted on the necessity of maintaining a traditional hierarchical chain of command, 
coordination, interoperability and jointness with the Pasdaran.307 For instance, one of the 
articles in Saff (February 2000) directly referred to the danger of a potential interservice 
rivalry.308 However, it was able to achieve quite a few objectives, mostly on the level of 
logistics.309 The corps largely ignored the offers, and until the mid-2000s, joint exercises 
and training involving both services were quite rare.310 Rivalry and clashes between the 
professional military and paramilitary cultures generated operational frictions, such as the 
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uncoordinated activities of the army and corp air forces (IRIAF and IRGAF, respectively) 
in the same airspace, which reportedly resulted in some cases of fratricide fire.311  
The post-9/11 changes in the geostrategic environment, primarily the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, provided a strong impetus to the hardliner wing within 
the regime312 to intercept the national-security agenda in anticipation of the incoming 
“decisive battle” with America (see Chapter III). These changes gave the IRGC an 
opportunity to advance an alternative strategic conceptual vision, centered on a doctrine 
of asymmetric warfare. The primary source of that doctrine was traced to the tightly knit 
group of officers in the IRGC’s Strategic Research Center, as well as some other 
informally associated think tanks like the Doctrinal Analysis Center for Security without 
Borders.313 The assertiveness of the proponents of the asymmetric strategy and their 
ability to manipulate perceptions of Khamenei grew proportionally as the U.S. bogged 
down in the Iraqi quagmire. 
To one extent or another, asymmetry has been a mainstay element of the IRI’s 
strategy since the revolution.314 Its philosophy can be found in the words of Ayatollah 
Khomeini: “Victory is not achieved by swords; it can only be achieved by blood.”315 The 
IRGC apparently fought its war with Iraq under this slogan, which stressed the spiritual 
and moral components of warfare. However, over time the corps developed more 
practical approaches towards asymmetric war. Based on a combination of multiple 
statements and publications by the senior IRGC commanders, the corps’ asymmetric 
warfare doctrine might be summarized as follows: (i) strategic deterrence with high-end 
weapons (e.g., ballistic missiles and emerging nuclear capability); (ii) disruption of 
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strategic energy-supply routes (e.g., the Hormuz Strait); (iii) a “mosaic defense” based on 
a decentralized command and control system envisaging a great degree of autonomy for 
commanders, more typical of revolutionary than regular forces; (iv) and unconventional 
operations, proxy wars, and terrorism.316 These components are interrelated and 
multiplied by ideology, especially in a culture of sacrifice and martyrdom. The doctrine 
emphasizes preemption: “If we do not resist America and Israel in Lebanon and 
Palestine, tomorrow we must engage in war with Israel and America at the frontiers of 
Iran” (Major General Firuzabadi, the chief of JS and an alumni).317 As stated by the 
current corps commander, Jaafari, “asymmetric warfare … is [our] strategy for dealing 
with significant capabilities of the enemy.”318  
Beyond strategic culture, doctrinal rivalry also affects force structure and 
operational posture.319 The Pasdaran became the first paramilitary force in the world 
that has ballistic-missile units in its order of battle and it probably will eventually have 
nukes as well, thus controlling the most valuable national-defense asset and further 
strengthening its nationwide influence.320 Its organic overseas special-operations 
command (IRGQF) supplements the strategic-deterrence capability with an 
unconventional one, while the army apparently lacks both. Its ground forces are scattered 
at threatened points along the national-borders periphery, while the IRGC, together with 
the Basij and law-enforcement forces, are placed in the vicinity of major population 
centers.321 Overall, the place of the regular army in the new doctrine that apparently 
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dominates senior headquarters in Tehran is not clear. It appears that the regular ground 
forces are left with territorial defense through conventional warfare.322  
As far as the IRIAF and the IRIN are concerned, there are certain indications that 
the corps was able to subdue these two branches of the regular military through its own 
seconded officers,323 or at least, find common understanding on operational issues, 
though this is difficult to assess precisely due to lack of information. The creation of the 
air defense as a “fourth branch” of the military in February 2009, in the apparent 
anticipation of air attack against nuclear facilities, leaves room for suggestion that it was 
the first real attempt to create a joint command to bring together the army’s technical 
expertise and corps control.324 Equally, the IRIN was able to come to an agreement about 
division of responsibility with the IRGN, taking over the Gulf and the Caspian Sea while 
the guards got the Hormuz Strait and the Indian Ocean;325 yet, the overall operational 
command in the area of potential conflict with the U.S. falls to the latter.326 One of the 
indicators of improving relations between the two services, or, perhaps, just of the 
vanishing of the institutional identity of the regular navy, became the first appointment of 
a professional naval officer as a commander in sixteen years, since that position from 
1989 to 2005 was manned by guards.327 
Overall, in assessing rivalry in the area of doctrinal influence, it is safe to 
conclude that the army lost this battle to the corps as well. In the clash of two 
philosophies of warfare—an instrumental approach defended by the army and the 
pragmatic wing of the regime versus the expressive approach pushed by the corps and the 
radicals—the latter group has won.328  
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4. Defense Budget 
Competition for financing and hardware has been a field of rivalry for as long as 
the corps has existed,329 and should not be treated separately from the struggle over war 
doctrines. Some patterns of this competition were described earlier. Analysis of the 
current defense and security budget confirms that the regular armed forces are far worse 
financed than the corps. For the 1388 Iranian fiscal year (March 2009–March 2010), the 
IRGG was allocated $5.1bn, the defense ministry–$4.63bn, the law-enforcement forces–
$2.07bn, the army–$1.96bn, the joint staff–$0.72bn, the MOIS–$ 0.52bn, and the MOI–
$0.44bn.330 Placed in the fourth position, the army by definition is not privileged, getting 
twice less money than the corps, though it is more than twice larger in number of 
servicemen.  
Furthermore, the weapons-acquisition process proceeds via the MODAFL, which 
is largely controlled by the alumni. The days when the army had a temporary preference 
in arms supplies were over with the presidency of Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Since the early 
2000s, the best portion of new armament, procured abroad or locally by the military-
industrial complex (already controlled by the IRGC) is at the disposal of Pasdaran 
forces. For example, its naval branch only recently received ten Houdong-class missile 
boats, built by North Korea, five C14 missile boats from China, and nearly forty new 
indigenously constructed IPS16-class patrol crafts.331 As for the army, it still has to rely 






329 On the division of the ruling establishment over the doctrinal issues see, Kagan, “Security 
Structures of Iran.” 
330 S. M. Zadonsky, “Characteristics of Budget of the Military Organization of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran,” The Institute of the Middle East, December 2009, [In Russian.] http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2009/27-
11-09a.htm (accessed January 4, 2009). 
331 Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009 – 2010, (Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: IHS (Global) 
Limited, 2009): 373–376. 
332 For a detailed account see, The Military Balance 2009, 245–247. 
 93
                                                
are unconfirmed reports that the regular air force and navy are to get some new weapons 
and equipment, but it will most likely be limited and probably related more to 
propaganda rather than to real developments.333 
Article 147 of the Iranian constitution, grants the armed forces an opportunity to 
develop certain types of economic and entrepreneurial activities in peacetime.334 While 
the IRGC fully utilizes such activities through its multiple outfits, the army is deprived of 
equal opportunities. Senior IRGC officers are also deeply integrated in business, where 
the distinction between a government job and personal interest is blurred. For instance, 
Major General Mostafa Mohammad Najar, current minister of the interior (an alumnus), 
is a member of the board of several industrial manufacturing companies.335 There are no 
known similar examples from the army side. Another side of the army’s inferiority is 
lower pay compared to the corps. This contributes directly into low prestige and social 
estimation of the former. The army draft is considered a form of serfdom, while corps 
service is a privilege. An indicator of the miserable financial and social status of the 
military is the semiofficial practice of the late 90s of receiving money (the equivalent of 
$16,000) from individual citizens willing to dodge the draft.336  
Overall, the issue of financing is an inherently effective leverage to influence 
military organizational behavior. Yet, in Iran’s realities the army is essentially deprived 
from lobbyist capabilities that make it possible to hope for substation money allocation. 
On the other side, the corps enjoys top preferentiality. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
consider the defense budget as a leverage of civilian influence that it supposed to be in 
theory.  
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E. SOCIETAL DIMENSION OF RIVALRY  
There are several dimensions that may appear to be outside the field of 
interservice rivalry, but nevertheless contribute to the overall strengthening of the corps’ 
position as “strategic force multipliers” and leave the army and other peer competitors 
with almost no chance of success as rivals. 
The IRGC has a strong link to Iranian society. Membership, or even indirect 
forms of affiliation with the institution, provides prestige, career opportunities, and 
financial preferences. Service in the guards is viewed as a “stepping stone for successful 
career”337 and a “valued credential.”338 Salaries, which are much better than in the army, 
provide substantial material stimulus.339 This is especially true for representatives of the 
peasant and lower urban class who constitute most of the corps ranks, as well as its Basij 
territorial force. For people from better social strata, service or other forms of close 
affiliation with the guards brings status.340 The Basij force has women’s battalions in its 
structure, while females are totally excluded from service with the regular army.341 
Taking into account family members and the oriental cultural tradition of extended 
kinship, the overall number of people who benefit one way or another from association 
with the corps grows much higher.342 For instance, the benefits to some categories of 
corps officers’ family members may include university admissions or state-subsidized 
commodities.343 Retired veterans (razamandegan), as well as war martyrs’ families, 
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represent another circle that strengthens the social tiers of the corps.344 All these 
categories combined to create the most reliable part of the regime’s powerbase.345  
An additional component in the social capital of the IRGC is its saga: popular 
narratives of “glorious performance” in revolution and war, of heroism and martyrdom, 
bring respect to the institution.346 The prestige of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as chief 
executive and the authority of the supreme leader’s endorsement are other primary assets 
of the alumni. All these dimensions bring building blocks to the emerged corporatism347 
of what was initially just an internal-security paramilitary. The corporatism of IRGC 
alumni has transformed it into elite that has breached its weak delimiters and launched an 
ongoing and widening offensive expansion. 
Neither the regular military nor other actors are even close to such a grand status 
or equal multipliers. The army, contained within its narrow professional domain, is 
belittled by the constant attempts of the corps to monopolize war glory and by low 
salaries. The MOIS, run by appointed clerics, is feared and unpopular, being discredited 
by the extrajudicial killings of the 80s and the 90s; moreover, it lacks a public posture 
due to the covert nature of the job and enjoys no military fame. The same is true for the 
corrupt MOI. As such, they are hardly able to perform any feasible counterbalance to the 
corps. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Interservice rivalry generally should be treated as a positive phenomenon, despite 
the negative connotation of the last word. Applied properly, it has proven to be an 
effective and efficient mechanism in managing the armed forces. In other words, “the 
absence of consensus–interservice rivalry–has long been seen as a tool of increased 
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civilian control of the military.”348 However, in applying this tool, a civilian leadership 
should follow several rules, already touched upon in the introduction to this chapter: 
maintain a balance by avoiding long-term preferentiality (i.e., do not distinguish any 
service as a permanent beneficiary); regularly revise and reshuffle the existing order to 
counterweight the most powerful service by partial empowering of other services; use 
sticks and carrots by distributing authority, responsibilities, and materiel resources; and 
preserve freedom of national-security decision-making by diversifying sources of 
strategic advice, doctrinal expertise, and intelligence. The philosophical essence of 
interservice rivalry is short and simple: keep a right equilibrium.    
Ali Khamenei, a center of gravity of Iran’s system of power, violated the principle 
of equilibrium, which was created and more or less kept by his predecessor Ayatollah 
Khomeini. Whether he violates it intentionally is not discussed in this thesis. What is 
important is the outcome. By distinguishing the IRGC as a key, if not sole, beneficiary, 
the supreme leader has been empowering the corps for more than two decades. 
Eventually, corps power reached such an extent that it can hardly be contained, due to the 
virtual absence of equal actors. The ignoring of the interservice rivalry track by 
Khamenei and his associates placed the alternative factions of the regime without levers 
of influence on the Pasdaran. Moreover, it deprived the entire system of CMR of 
effective balances in the form of real hard-power assets, leaving only soft (legislative and 
bureaucratic) checking mechanisms, supplemented by the equally soft capabilities of the 
SNSC, MOIS, MOI, and ministry of the judiciary. Even the MOIS, once the regime’s 
most trusted agent, is losing its previous roles in internal security and foreign intelligence 
to the IRGC. At the same time, the re-incorporation of the Basij force into the corps and 
continuing negation of such potentially able actors as the regular army make the IRGC 
unmatched in the number of “boots on the ground” it is able to deploy for its own 
purposes in case of political contingency.  
It would be difficult to expect a different outcome, given the starting conditions of 
the rivalry between the two Iranian military services and the aggravation of this 
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inequality through time. The Artesh is banned from politics and moreover had to pass a 
“de-politicization recycle” in the form of violent purges. Compared to the IRGC, the 
army is less than mediocre in its administrative resource and institutional influence: the 
command-and-control structures the army reports to—the MODAFL and joint staff—are 
controlled by the Pasdaran. These structures are responsible for operational control, 
weapons acquisition, and logistics, making the regular military dependent on the corps’ 
will. The army’s influence on the formulation and implementation of national-security 
strategy is not visible, at least since the mid-00s. It remains essentially out of politics, 
being subjugated by the existing system and self-restrained by its professional culture. 
At inception, the Pasdaran was an irregular political force for the defense of the 
regime, by design. However, professionalization and rising competence attained through 
war increased the corps’ self-confidence, and paradoxically, led to the growing 
interference with politics that has become so obvious since 1999. This development 
defies Samuel Huntington’s paradigm of professionalization, which implies the 
increasing professional autonomy leads to concentration of the military on its own tasks, 
restraining its willingness and ability to intervene in politics.349 Autonomy granted to the 
IRGC by the supreme leader did not restrain the corps’ intervention into politics. Instead, 
self-professionalization and credentials earned in fighting, combined with an 
ideologically centered institutional culture, reinforced its ability and will to exert pressure 
on the political system, making the Pasdaran the only really independent actor in the 
defense and security community.350 This suggests that the findings of such theorists in 
civil–military relations as Samuel Finer and Morris Janowitz better explain the Iranian 
phenomenon than does Huntington’s paradigm. Both hold that attained professionalism 
enables and encourages the military to act more vigorously, and its politicization is 
inevitable due to increased outreach, especially in an environment of perceived external 
threat.351  
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Thus, an absence of a felt need to redirect the services’ energy from the political 
domain (with one service “invited” into politics and another excluded) has lowered the 
importance of classical interservice rivalry in the eyes of the regime. Interservice rivalry 
became further diminished by the asymmetric, one-sided advantages granted to one 
competitor and the virtual exclusion of others. As a result, the whole notion of 
interservice rivalry technique has evolved into almost a fiction, replaced, instead, by 
animosity. Instead of having rivalry act as an engine of the military’s functionality and 
control over the security sector, the Iranian regime, willingly or not, created an 
environment where relations between the army and corps developed in the shadow of 
“ambivalence, mistrust, and outright hostility.”352 The army lost to the corps in all 
possible areas: strategy influence, the information domain, doctrines, and budget 
distribution. More broadly, it fell to a much lower social status, incomparable with the 
IRGC’s.   
It is important to emphasize the differences between interservice rivalry in Iran 
and the West. In the latter, rivalry is driven primarily by professional competition. It is 
restrained by virtue of firm professional ethos, codes of behavior, integrity,353 and 
functioning institutional and legal frameworks. Rivalry in Iran is, by contrast, predatory, 
as illustrated by the corps’ role in the bloody purges of the Artesh. It is a zero-sum 
game—not only the army, the only institution inherited by the Islamic Republic from the 
monarchy—but even the structures created by the regime itself—the MOIS and the 
MOI—are the targets of the Pasdaran institutional expansion. This rivalry is by 
definition a part of Iran’s political factionalism and power struggle. It is informal rather 
than institutionalized. It is less bureaucratic than in Western (i.e., democratic) settings 
and much more personality-centered.  
In conclusion, interservice rivalry in Iran is usually assumed to be a relatively 
routine and almost even process.354 However, the reality is not so. Iranian interservice 
rivalry is uneven and asymmetric, with only one side—the IRGC— enjoying permanent 
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privilege and growing status, as granted by the top civilian authorities. As for the current 
moment, the situation is hopeless for the army and, increasingly, other participants. It 
does not mean that the rivalry is completely ceased to exist. The abovementioned 
complaints in the media from the top army commanders against the corps prove the 
opposite. Yet, as such, in Iran rivalry does not play the customary role reflected in CMR 
theory or translated into working practice in many other countries (e.g., by the creation of 
effective levers, checks, and balances). Moreover, this hollow rivalry emboldens the 
privileged side and creates a stimulus towards maximizing gains. Violation of the 
equation has led to a negative impact on the entire state of civilian control and civil–
military relations in Iran. It became one of the key factors that made the IRGC able to 
cross the “red line” and become an aggressive independent political actor. Such an 
outcome, regardless of the initial driving rationales, apparently was not an intended goal 
of the Iranian regime. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Survival in the face of domestic and external challenges and threats is a primary 
concern of many regimes in the Third World in general, and of the Middle East in 
particular.355 To ensure survival, regimes create proper security-management tools. 
However, it is not an unusual situation, when at some point, a regime’s military or 
paramilitary structures overcome or sideline their creators by intervening into politics. 
This “Frankenstein syndrome” is particularly referred to in The Armed Forces in 
Contemporary Asian Societies: “There is an oft-forgotten truism that through their 
endeavors to strengthen internal stability and international status, ruling elites create 
modern military forces then fall prey to their own creation.”356 Such an outcome is 
hardly to be inte
The Iranian IRGC represents an eloquent example of such an outcome. The 
stages, patterns, and reasons of the rise of the Pasdaran have been described and 
analyzed in this thesis. A summary and re-emphasis of key findings follows. 
1. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
1. In the past three decades, the IRGC made a remarkable evolution from a ragtag 
paramilitary group, created by a new regime for its own security needs, to the most potent 
politico-military entity in Iran. This entity is a hybrid, combining the existing institution 
and its alumni. 
2. The corps became transformed into a supra-service “on steroids,” concentrating 
different organic components and functions: conventional, strategic deterrence, 
intelligence, special operations, law and ideology enforcement, territorial mobilization, 
logistics, construction and engineering, military industry, propaganda, and information 
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operations. It attained a corporate identity, elitist status, and a philosophy that justifies its 
existence, performance, and hunger for power. Its alumni control substantial 
administrative resources, institutional outreach, and lobbying capabilities. It possesses 
tools of real power and applies them in the domestic and foreign arenas. 
3. The empowerment of the IRGC by the regime through the past three decades 
was intentional. The goal was maintaining internal security, strengthening defense 
capabilities, and achieving foreign-policy goals. However, at a certain stage, after the 
Revolutionary Guard achieved the point at which it was able to influence the regime itself 
(which was supposed to be the principal vis-à-vis IRGC), the process of empowerment 
became self-sustaining. It may be suggested that while empowerment was the desire, the 
outcome—the self-empowerment, growing assertiveness, and predatory behavior of the 
corps—was obviously not. Thus, intended actions led to unintended consequences and 
unexpected challenges. 
4. The explanation of such developments is found in the regime’s lack of 
homogeneity and its fragmentation. The power of the Pasdaran rose not only from the 
“barrel of a gun,” but also from its ability to navigate and operate in the complex maze of 
Iranian power and politics. By identifying the center of gravity of the entire system—the 
supreme leader— and establishing special symbiotic and mutually expedient relations,357 
the IRGC alumni were able to exploit a window of opportunity and secure decisive 
preferences, which it now maximizes. 
5. The current degree of power and ambitions of the IRGC are potentially placing 
it in a position to achieve a soft takeover of the key nodes of the government and security 
sectors. This “slow-motion coup”358 is occurring in different ways, all legal. It takes 
place through existing institutions and procedures, through turf wars between informal 
centers of power, by strengthening corporate economic power, by building an 
information dominance, military-expertise monopoly, and strategic influence. This de 
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facto creeping coup is a unique example in contemporary politics and civil–military 
relations. The corps units are in their barracks and there are no tanks in the streets; yet, 
Iran steadily moves toward a form of military dictatorship.  
6. The primary power asset of the corps is its alumni, a cohort formed by retired 
and acting personnel entrenched across the entire spectrum of Iran’s state and society. 
The alumni are former revolutionary students of the late ‘70s who became field military 
commanders in the ‘80s, and in the ‘90s turned either into uniformed bureaucrats in 
active service, civilian apparatchiki, or wealthy entrepreneurs. These veterans maintain 
an informal network, preserving their cohesion and comradeship and serving as the 
vanguard of the IRGC. The latter, as a military service, performs as their force multiplier. 
The hybrid of those two components transforms the corps into a de facto corporation. The 
Pasdaran, Incorporated, is not just a servant of the regime anymore; it is a part of it, 
perhaps already the most important. The phenomenon of the corporatism and elitism of 
the guards and its alumni is best described by its commander, Major General Jaafari, who 
stated that “the Revolutionary Guards differs from all military organizations of the world 
and we believe that in the work for the regime, especially in the Revolutionary Guards, 
there is no such thing as retirement.”359  
2. Civil–Military Relations and Interservice Rivalry in Iran 
1. Iranian civil–military relations suffer deeply from pathologies, which were laid 
at its foundation with the emergence of the post-revolutionary political order and 
developed at further stages. These pathologic civil–military relations mirror the specifics 
of the entire system of power, such as hollow institutions, fragmentation, the existence of 
different competing networks and centers of power, and informality.  
2. The empowerment of the IRGC is a direct result of the state of the civil–
military relations field. The military forces are generally reflecting the “goals, aspirations, 
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and organizational effectiveness of the elites who manage them.”360 The allocation to the 
corps of a political role by the post-revolutionary regime was a starting point for all 
future developments. 
3. Some degree of political influence for any military force in general is 
inevitable. Since military establishments represent “complex political communities,” they 
are structurally adapted to such a role by virtue of a profession concerned with external 
defense.361 Such a modest and self-restrained political function, in general, is considered 
positive. However, the evolution from a political to a politicized military force represents 
a great peril for a regime.362 A political force is just an object of politics—a tool, 
controlled and used by civilian governmental institutions. As such, it intervenes into 
politics by regime’s sanction. However, at a certain stage, a force excessively politicized 
in the spirit of subjective civilian control starts to determine political preferences and 
even intervene itself as a subject of politics. In 1980, the Pasdaran was created as a 
political force in defense of the system; by 2010, the double-edged sword of intended 
politicization transformed it into one of the system’s major stakeholders. For the first 
time in modern Iranian history, a military force was able to challenge the supreme 
authority.  
4. By unilateral empowerment of the Pasdaran in multiple ways, the regime 
violated a major paradigm of interservice rivalry, based on the creation of mutual checks 
and balances in the form of competing services. The degree of organizational integrity 
matters, because cohesive forces tend to intervene more into politics, as opposed to those 
divided, led by multiple and competitive commands.363 Allowing the corps to subdue the 
regular army, and more recently, even the ministry of intelligence, the regime deprived 
itself of the possibility of balancing, building checks, and using levers of influence and 
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control over the forces. This institutional expansion and merging has essentially placing 
all but one segment of the security sector under full or partial control of the IRGC, 
leaving the government with only legalistic and bureaucratic checks to “divide and rule.”  
5. Most likely, such development was caused initially by a feeling, in the regime 
quarter, that the regular military, subjected to purges, Islamization, and war, has not 
represented an immediate danger. Consequently, the value of rivalry as a management 
technique was reduced significantly: “Due to neutralization of the army as a potential 
dangerous counter-force and due to the loyalty of the IRGC leadership to the 
safeguarding of the system’s survival including its theocratic ideology, which is the 
raison d’être of the IRGC, the civilian ruler reign uncontested.”364  
6. However, negation of rivalry as a fair form of competition caused a “domino 
effect,” eventually reducing the entire notion of civilian control to irrelevance. Using the 
corps as a multipurpose tool, like a “Swiss army knife,” from supervising the nuclear 
program to counter-drugs operations and disaster relief, the regime has built a 
dependency. Generally, dependency on the military establishment for maintaining 
internal order or managing external threats objectively leads to less control of the civilian 
leadership over the military, and the growing interference of the latter into politics.365 
The resulting dependence of the Iranian regime on the guards’ protection softened the 
former and further empowered the latter. 
7. The Western paradigms of interservice rivalry are not fully applicable to the 
case in study. Interservice rivalry in Iran is an objective reality; it exists, despite the 
obvious dissimilarity and disparity between the involved services. However, it differs 
from Western notions by a key factor: politicization of the military forces, which does not 
occur in democratic political settings. Furthermore, the rivalry between the Iranian 
military services is predatory, sometimes even violent. It is less institutionalized and 
normative, more informal and personal. It differs even from surrounding regional 
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parameters, as indicated in the Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and 
Strategy.366 Of the six common denominators of civilian control over the military and 
interservice rivalry in the Middle East (military dichotomy; promotion and assignment on 
the basis of loyalty rather than professionalism; frequent command-cadres rotation; 
discouragement of initiative; preference towards an elite segment, such as a selected tribe 
or clan; and periodical purges), only the first three are applicable in the case of the 
Pasdaran (the last point is applicable to the Artesh). This suggests that political, 
historical, cultural, and other variables are important in each unique case. Consequently, 
civil–military relations should particularly emphasize a study of military tradition and put 
it into historical perspective—especially when a military force has participated in 
revolution or a struggle for liberation—to explain how and why legacy factor cause 
intervention or non-intervention into politics in each specific case.367 The same is true of 
an external-threat environment as a variable influencing military intervention into 
politics. 
B. QUO VADIS? 
The events of 2009 indicated the departure from an outdated vision of the IRGC, 
from its being perceived as a tool at the disposal of the IRI’s clerical regime towards an 
understanding of the IRGC phenomenon as a strategic factor. As it was put by Rasool 
Nafisi, an Iranian expert at the RAND Corporation, “it is not a theocracy anymore. It is a 
regular military security government with a facade of a Shiite clerical system.”368 Amir 
Taheri, a prominent media analyst, echoes the previous statement: “What they want [the 
revolutionary guard] is a ‘Turkish’ model in which the IRGC is acknowledged as the 
backbone of the regime with a veto over major decisions, a version of the ‘walayat al-
faqih’ (custodianship of the cleric) in which boots replace the mullah's flip-flops.”369 The 
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statement of U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in February 2010 on the emerging 
“military dictatorship” in Iran370 indicates that the vision of the research community and 
media is shared by the U.S. government.  
Obviously, since the 2009 election crisis, Iran is much more unstable, and the 
regime appears less monolithic. The political landscape is fragmented. Factional struggle 
between different elitist circles, divided over opposite visions of the future of the country, 
ways of modernization, and relations with the world, is exacerbated. Iranian politics is 
undergoing generational change. The political controversies that have emerged in this 
regard are grouped along two proposed courses of action: controlled change and the 
status quo.371  
The ongoing protracted crisis will likely evolve into a tenser phase; the question is 
not “if,” but rather “when.” The trigger event might be random, such as the death of the 
supreme leader, external conflict, or an opposition street protest transformed into a mass 
uprising. Closer to the presidential elections of 2013, the political situation and related 
activities of factional elites might reach the boiling point; the wildcard of the Iranian 
nuclear row with the world should be taken into account as well.  
The issue of succession remains a key factor in the foreseeable future. It is a 
wildcard, since the death or incapacity of the supreme leader might occur any time. This 
major event would remove the formal issue of the corps’ personal loyalty to Khamenei as 
a last obstacle to ultimate power. The succession might be a tipping point at which the 
authoritative leader would be replaced by a figurehead manipulated by the alumni. It is 
not an easy task to model the behavior of the IRGC in the described environment, 
especially under pressure and stress. It is not impossible to exclude that it would not be 
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societies, and the Pasdaran is no exception. Its crosscutting cleavages are relevant from 
the standpoint of two categories: the junior ranks and officers, on one side, and the upper 
command echelon and the alumni on the other. 
The IRGC’s upper echelon (i.e., the acting command and alumni) is most likely 
divided along politico-ideological fault lines, like the whole establishment.372 The 
oligarchic wing that is involved in economic activities is presumably interested in stable 
domestic conditions and the external environment. A certain part of the IRGC “fat cats” 
might gravitate towards the pragmatist camp associated with former president Hashemi-
Rafsanjani. This segment might be interested in “authoritarian modernization.” To 
achieve that goal, it might forge an alliance with the technocratic class, due to its own 
managerial insufficiency in the field of economics.373 This potential development would 
indicate an attempt to copycat the bureaucratic-authoritarian model that was implemented 
by Latin American militaries and technocrats in the 60s–70s.374 
However, the most influential and hardcore “principlist” faction, associated with 
Ahmadinejad, might be interested less in the above scenario than in maintaining the 
status quo. Paradoxically, in order to keep it, this group may try to switch the domestic 
crisis into an external mode through an intended destabilization.375 A same logic led 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1980 to claim the war with Iraq as a “God-given event” to unite 
the nation.376 Security and foreign strategies and policies would be a continuation of 
domestic political processes. The corps’ strategic influence, information near-dominance, 
and war-fighting doctrinal monopoly, enhanced by its autonomy, zeal, and virtual 
absence of control, are creating the preconditions for a potential redux of the “cult of the 
offensive.” This phenomenon was described by Jack Snyder in his analysis of the non-
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controlled organizational behavior of the military establishment, separated from, but still 
influencing, its supreme commander in chief, who was persuaded to make the final 
decision of pushing the European continent into war.377In case internal crisis in Iran 
really threatened the existence of the regime, incentives, in the radical quarters of the 
IRGC, to convert it into an external conflict will likely rise exponentially.  
As far as the corps’ junior strata (representing the new generation) is concerned, 
there is much less benefit from membership in the IRGC.378 The problems of internal 
division and potential dissent are especially salient for the Basij force, recently returned 
into the corps’ order of battle. As a territorial militia, recruited mostly from 
impoverished, part-time militiamen, with their regional, local, and ethnic affiliations, the 
Basij gives the IRGC a real social dimension. However, it represents, as such, the corps’ 
Achilles heel, just in the shah’s army’s action of 1979, when the crackdown on street 
protesters alienated the junior ranks and eventually caused them to change their loyalty 
and defect to the revolutionary side. 
The role of the Iranian regular army in future developments is hard to calculate, 
due to its low and obscure position, particularly observed during the 2009 crisis, when it 
did not issue a single statement on developing events. There is only a slim chance that 
Khamenei would decide to counterbalance the radical wing of the guards by the 
temporary empowering of the army. For such purposes he would rather use the IRGC 
alumni’s top members, like A. Larijani. Y.-R. Safavi, or M. Rezai.379 Yet, media-
recorded exchanges between army commanders and the IRGC on the interpretation of the 
war with Iraq indicate that their mutual hostility is well and alive. Nevertheless, any 
external crisis would likely make the regular military concentrate entirely on defense 
tasks, as in 1980.  
 
377 For details see, Jack Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 
1984,” International Security, Vol. 9, 1(Summer 1984), 108–146. 
378 Thaler and others, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership 
Dynamics, xv–xvi. 
379 “Iran: The Supreme Leader Takes Control.” 
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ions. 
                                                
Overall, the future developments in Iran and the destiny of the regime are strongly 
depending on the evolution of civil–military relations.380 And the IRGC is in a very 
focus of these relat
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The notes below should not be considered as policy recommendations, addressed 
to any specific side (be it policymakers or analysts), but rather as a food for thought in 
dealing with Iran. 
• The IRGC should be treated as a factor of strategic significance. It is not an 
omnipotent actor in the Iranian theatre, but perhaps the ultimate one. The 
IRGC will be a center of gravity of any future developments in Iran. 
• The Pasdaran, Incorporated has two soft points: its economic empire and the 
Basij militia. The former, associated with corruption and foreign investments, 
represents a good target for international sanctions, criminal prosecution, and 
other forms of pressure. The latter introduces a social dimension that might 
play a paramount role in case of deepening political and socioeconomic crisis. 
• In case of the replacement of the current supreme leader by a more pro forma 
figure controlled or manipulated by the corps, the main political and 
information effort should be aimed at delegitimizing the IRGC as a de facto 
ruling entity. As such, it should be displayed as responsible for most of the 
existing or emerging problems in Iran. 
• Any political force other than the current regime in Iran will have to correct 
the asymmetry in civil–military relations by empowering other actors in the 
security sector—first of all, by bringing the regular army back and making 
interservice rivalry real. This would be an only way to restrain the IRGC as an 
institution. 
 
380 Certainly, there are also many other important variables that determine the Iranian dynamics. 
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• The political divisions within the corps establishment, the growing 
generational gap between older commanders and the younger ranks,381 and 
the rift between the IRGC and the army should be targeted by driving a 
wedge. 
• The challenge that the IRGC represents for future security-sector reform in 
case of potential regime change from within, should not be underestimated by 
any political force that will replace it.  
• The Pasdaran phenomenon needs to be further researched and studied. 
Overall, the Iranian revolutionary guards have almost evolved into praetorian 
guards, or, to extend the historical analogy, to the janissaries at their last and least 
glorious stage. When these military forces were at the zenith of their political power, both 
the Roman and the Ottoman empires had started to slide irreversibly towards decay. It is 
impossible to exclude that by creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the 
Iranian regime implanted its own self-destructing code, which now is activated. The past 
is prologue. 
 
381 Wehrey and others, Dangerous but not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of 
Iranian Power in the Middle East, 69. 
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